Nietzsche's Free Self

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MPhilStud 2016

Abstract

Nietzsche's accounts of selfhood and freedom appear to contain inconsistencies. At a theoretical level, Nietzsche suggests that our common conceptions of selfhood and freedom are poisonous illusions. However, his practical philosophy utilises both concepts. This thesis explores and resolves these inconsistencies. It is argued that Nietzsche's practical philosophy does not require the concepts that he theoretically rejects. Without presupposing consistency, it is shown that an attempt to resolve the inconsistencies should be undertaken. Nietzsche was not deliberately inconsistent in these areas. To set the scene for a positive account of Nietzschean selfhood, an analysis of Nietzsche's drive psychology and treatment of conscious deliberation is undertaken. The Nietzschean self should be understood as a complex structure of interacting drives and affects. This account of selfhood maintains Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical and transcendental conceptions of self whilst avoiding excessive reductionism. It is argued that by redefining selfhood, Nietzsche can coherently endorse a drive-based fatalism and the ideal of self-creation. Importantly, it is shown how self-creation can be a self-consciously subjective act. One achieves subjectivity when one comes to view oneself as a Nietzschean self. Nietzsche finds freedom within his fatalistic framework in two ways. Firstly, Nietzschean autonomy is achieved when one follows values legislated by one's own will to power. Secondly, ultimate freedom is constituted by a freedom from nihilism. One achieves such freedom when one can affirm the doctrine of eternal recurrence. It is also argued that Nietzsche's general philosophical project can be reconciled with his fatalism. Far from a contradiction, Nietzsche's practical philosophy is a total reckoning with and overcoming of his theoretical work. The result is an ambitiously subversive philosophy.

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Acknowledgements

Uttermost thanks go to Dr. Sacha Golob for his invaluable supervision, support and guidance throughout the process of researching and writing this thesis.

I would also like to thank my other supervisors for their support and guidance during my time at King's College London. The research conducted with these individuals has all fed into this thesis either directly or indirectly. Thanks go to: Dr. John Callanan, Dr. William E.S. McNeill, Dr. Clayton Littlejohn and Dr. Nadine Elzein.

Thank you to everyone who attended and contributed to the Nietzsche reading group organised by myself and Emma Syea. Special thanks go to Emma, Fintan Mallory and Claudia Godwin for their help in keeping the group running and their insightful thoughts. The reading group made an enormous contribution to my research.

Further thanks go to Emma for her incredibly useful comments on the thesis.

I am extremely grateful to my friends and family who have offered consistent encouragement throughout my studies. Thank you to those who discussed any aspect of the work with me at any stage. Special thanks go to James and Stu who both made different, but crucial contributions to the production of the thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank Lucy for her vital and unwavering support and interest in my work.

Nietzsche's Free Self

"Where can one think of fleeing, if the cell is everything?"

-Bernardo Soares[1]

1 - Introduction

Nietzsche's accounts of freedom and selfhood appear to contain inconsistencies. They arise when one attempts to combine his theoretical and practical philosophy. At a theoretical level, Nietzsche suggests that our common conceptions of agential freedom and selfhood are poisonous illusions. However, his practical philosophy seems to utilise both concepts. My solution to this problem is that we must interpret Nietzsche's practical philosophy in a way that does not require the notions of selfhood and freedom that he theoretically eliminates. I suggest that Nietzsche reintroduces selfhood and freedom into his practical philosophy on his own radical terms.

I begin by presenting my methodology and elucidating the inconsistencies under analysis. I then explore two recent arguments that claim these inconsistencies cannot and should not be overcome. Concluding that these arguments are unsuccessful, I develop a resolution. This proceeds with an exploration of Nietzsche's drive psychology and account of consciousness. I then explore the idea that a Nietzschean self is a "social structure of the drives" (BGE: 12). Anderson (2012) has offered a nuanced, but problematic account of this reading. Working from Anderson, I develop my own account of Nietzschean selfhood. I then argue that Nietzschean selves can be free in two ways. Firstly, we are 'autonomous' when we follow values that benefit our power. Secondly, Nietzsche's ideal freedom amounts to a 'freedom from nihilism'. These notions of freedom do not require the kind of free will that Nietzsche attacks. I will therefore conclude that Nietzsche's theoretical and practical accounts of selfhood and freedom are not inconsistent because his practical understanding of such notions does not require the concepts that he theoretically rejects. To the contrary, it is developed from and overcomes the theoretical rejection of such concepts.

[1] *The Book of Disquiet*, F. Pessoa. Section 43.

2 - Nietzschean Inconsistency

2.1 Methodology

Here I will mark the boundaries of my exploration, rather than enter the debate over how best to conduct Nietzsche scholarship. Firstly, I am not concerned with examining what Nietzsche could, would or should have written. I am concerned with the philosophical content of his work, primarily the work published during his life. This involves interpreting certain passages in terms of other passages, rather than in terms of what Nietzsche may or should have believed. Of course this involves choosing the guiding passages for one's interpretation. In *Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)* 12, Nietzsche claims that those who reject traditional conceptions of selfhood are "condemned…to *inventing* the new - and, who knows? perhaps to *finding* it". This passage is not only my guiding light in terms of Nietzschean selfhood, but characterises my general approach to Nietzsche's work. I read him as radically reconceiving of selfhood, freedom, and, despite my focus, much else.

Secondly, my aim is to elucidate Nietzsche's philosophy rather than to make it acceptable to contemporary readers. I will not argue that one should accept the philosophy below as '*the* truth', but that one should accept it as *Nietzsche's philosophy*.

Finally, that Nietzsche's work contains at least superficial inconsistencies is well documented. A more contested matter is whether or not Nietzsche aimed at a philosophical 'system'. Furthermore, if there is a system, it may not be present on the surface. If one does not accept that Nietzsche was accidentally inconsistent, there are two ways one can approach an inconsistency. One can claim that it is a consequence of a deliberately unsystematic philosophy. Alternatively, a resolution can be attempted. This can be approached in a number of intricate ways. One could either develop a consistent *Nietzschean* system or argue that there is consistency within Nietzsche's writing. If the latter, one could attempt to find *Nietzsche's* system. Alternatively, one can maintain that Nietzsche was unsystematic, but argue that the examined inconsistency does not contain any contradictions of thought. A different 'resolution' approach is to claim that the inconsistency is deliberate or the result of our misunderstanding the role of certain passages.

My approach to Nietzschean Inconsistency starts from the position that there is nothing inherently wrong with looking for consistency whilst remaining agnostic

about how systematic Nietzsche aimed to be on any level. A search for consistency need not presuppose that it exists or that, if it does not, the inconsistency is problematic. If lack of contradictory thought in my chosen area can be found, I do not pretend that this supports the idea of a systematic Nietzsche or vice versa.

2.2 Theoretical and Practical Inconsistencies

I understand the theoretical-practical distinction as follows. Nietzsche's practical philosophy is his *putatively* normative philosophy. The theoretical designates Nietzsche's descriptive exploration of human existence.

Nietzsche's theoretical elimination of the self focuses on the notion of an 'I' or soul that is simple, identical and has causal powers.

> "That belief which regards the soul as…indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an *atomon*: this belief ought to be ejected from science!" (BGE: 12)

> "When I analyse the event expressed in the sentence 'I think', I acquire a series of rash assertions which are difficult, perhaps impossible to prove - for example, that it is *I* who think, that is has to be something at all which thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of as a cause, that an 'I' exists." (BGE: 16)

> "There is no 'being' behind doing, acting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction imposed on the doing - the doing itself is everything." (GM I: 13)

The first quote points to a rejection of any sort of Platonic or Christian soul. The target here is a simple, identical and eternal entity. The second appears to target Kant. By analysing the 'I' of 'I think' Kant finds a *transcendental self* existing as a logical function necessary for thought. We know of its existence a priori and, whilst it is non-substantial, it is necessarily simple and identical. Thought, for Kant, is an activity of this 'I' (C: B133, B407-408). In the third quote, Nietzsche rejects the self considered as separate from action. This is the idea that the self exists prior to its 'doings' and at least *can be* the cause of and locus of responsibility for those 'doings'.

Nietzsche also appears to hold a deterministic world view incompatible with free will.

> "If one were all-knowing, one would be able to calculate every individual action…The actor himself…is fixed in the illusion of the free will." (HH: 106)

One of Nietzsche's aims was to explore how we might overcome nihilism. Nietzschean nihilism is a will to nothingness (GM: II-24. May, 2009: p.89). This will is "an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental pre-conditions of life" (GM: III-28). We will see later that nihilism manifests itself differently throughout history and the term, for Nietzsche, is incredibly broad in scope. There can even be a tension between different forms of nihilism. The ascetic ideal overcomes suicidal nihilism by giving suffering a meaning (GM: III-28), but both approaches to the world are manifestations of the will to nothingness. Nothingness, for Nietzsche, is that which is not part of reality (May, 2009: p.100). The ascetic ideal posits absolute values, afterlives, gods, and hates life as it really is. It wills nothingness. The suicidal nihilist holds that there are no absolute values and life is without meaning. Nietzsche agrees that absolute values do not exist. However, the suicidal nihilist is mistaken in thinking that life is thereby void of *any* value or meaning. Both positions are rebellions against life, but the mode of rebellion is different, as are the consequences. Nietzsche pushes nihilism to its limits by undermining everything that has hitherto provided us with meaning. Nihilism becomes a practical crisis. We will come to see ourselves as the impotent, godless and meaningless "plaything[s] of absurdity" (GM: III-28). However, Nietzsche aims to show us the way beyond this crisis towards an affirmation of life and overcoming of the will to nothingness. Selfhood plays a key role here. Nietzsche thought that free individuals would create their own values and meaning for life. We are urged to become who we are, to affirm our individual natures (GS: 270, 335. TSZ: *Honey Offering*). Individuals capable of escaping nihilism are capable of *self*-creation. Most scholars acknowledge that Nietzsche does not completely theoretically reject the notion of selfhood. Rather, he rejects certain common conceptions of selfhood. We must then find his positive account of selfhood.

Further tensions arise through Nietzsche's rejection of free will. If we have no free will it seems as though it will be difficult to self-create. Leiter (2001) has referred to this as "The paradox of fatalism and self-creation".

1) **Fatalism:** "A person's life proceeds along a fixed trajectory, fixed by 'natural' facts about that person." (Leiter, 2001: p.287)
2) **Self-Creation:** "The trajectory of a person's life is something that that person creates." (Leiter, 2001: p.289)

Nietzsche appears to theoretically endorse some kind of fatalism whilst practically suggesting that free individuals can create their own "trajectory". Leiter suggests that for a person to create themselves they must satisfy two conditions.

a) "The person must be the necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, cause of what he becomes ('Causal Condition') [**(CC)**].
b) The person, in fulfilling the Causal Condition, must satisfy the requirements for autonomous or free action ('Autonomy Condition') [**(AC)**]." (Leiter, 2001: p.289)

Leiter distinguishes between classical determinism, classical fatalism and causal essentialism. He suggests that Nietzsche was a causal essentialist. This is the view "that there are essential natural facts about persons that significantly circumscribe the range of life trajectories that person can realize" (Leiter, 2001: p.289). These facts interact with one's "environment and circumstances" such that external factors will also play a role in determining one's trajectory (Leiter, 2001: p.299). Nietzsche refers to these facts as 'drives'. It is a matter of significant debate as to whether or not drives are 'natural' or have a biological basis. This matter is beyond the scope of my work here. Remaining agnostic about the extent of Nietzsche's naturalism, the idea is that drives solely determine who we are. Nietzsche's causal essentialism (henceforth: fatalism) appears to preclude the possibility of AC. Leiter suggests that if we are to meet AC then we must have free will, but that Nietzsche rejects compatibilism. Given the truth of fatalism, Nietzsche rejects free will. Nietzsche rejects the concept of a *causa sui*. "The desire for 'freedom of will' in that metaphysical superlative sense…is nothing less than the desire to be precisely that *causa sui*" (BGE: 21). However, we

are no such thing as there is no such thing as a *causa sui* (BGE: 21). "Our 'will' is an artefact of the facts about us, and thus can not be the source of genuinely autonomous action" (Leiter, 2001: p.292).

Nietzsche's rejection of the *complete* freedom of the will, as *causa sui*, need not commit him to a rejection of free will outright. One may be strongly pushed in certain directions, but have some autonomous control over what one does. Alternatively, one may be free to identify or align oneself with the facts that determine one's action. Leiter argues that Nietzsche does reject free will outright. Take another statement of the paradox.

> "If a person's life trajectories are determined…by the natural facts about himself, then how can a person really create himself, i.e. how can he make an *autonomous* causal contribution to the course of that life?" (Leiter, 2001: p.289)

Understanding Nietzsche in this way either assumes or implies a certain view of personhood or selfhood. The picture is that a person is made up of subpersonal 'facts' that are *about* that person and something else that *is* that person[2]. The 'something else' **(X)** appears to be 'the person' or accounts for the existence of personhood. If the X is not solely constitutive of personhood, it is posited as the seat of autonomous control over oneself. The *possibility* of autonomous control is projected onto the X. If subpersonal facts determine our every action at every level then we have no autonomous control. Leiter reads Nietzsche as claiming that this is the case. He understands Nietzsche as claiming that conscious deliberation is epiphenomenal and that the X, whatever it is, has no control. The X is seen as some kind of "conscious self" which is causally inert (Leiter, 2001: p.318). We can therefore refine Leiter's incompatibilist reading somewhat. Nietzsche was an incompatibilist fatalist in terms of free will understood as the autonomous (to any degree) control of an X over action or subpersonal facts **(X-incompatibilism)**. Leiter does not provide such a refinement

[2] Throughout this work the personal/subpersonal distinction is *not* used as a Dennettian distinction between different kinds of explanation for behaviour (Hornsby, 2000: p.6-8). Following the literature on Nietzsche, the distinction is between aspects of an individual that constitute selfhood/personhood (personal) and those that do not (subpersonal).

himself because for him X-incompatibilism just is outright incompatibilism. No understanding of free will is compatible with the truth of fatalism because any such understanding must attribute free will to an X, but fatalism precludes such attribution. There are two points to make here.

Although an inconsistency exists on a certain reading of Nietzsche, I have yet to argue for such a fatalist reading. I will motivate this reading when I put forward my account of Nietzschean selfhood.

Secondly, I will defend a compatibilist reading of Nietzsche if compatibilism is understood vaguely as the idea that *some* notion of freedom is compatible with fatalism. I will argue that Nietzsche redefines what it means to be free and thus moves beyond outright incompatibilism.

Before resolving the above inconsistencies we must tackle arguments put forward by Gardner (2009) and Stern (2015) that suggest attempts at resolution are futile.

3 - Deliberate Inconsistencies

3.1 A Sign of the Times

Gardner focuses on the problem of valuing when highlighting Nietzsche's inconsistency. There are two important features of Nietzschean valuing. Firstly, the ideal individual must see themselves as the "*ground* of the value that he affirms" (Gardner, 2009: p.8). 'Ground' here is meant to capture the idea that an individual must legislate their own values. Acts of legislation constitute an agent's values. The second feature of valuing is that our values reflect and constitute who we are. We affirm ourselves when we affirm our values. "To determine such and such to be of value is to determine *oneself*, and to affirm oneself *by way of* affirming what one values" (Gardner, 2009: p.8-9). The language here highlights the problem. Valuing is bound to the concept of a self that is active in the creation of value.

Gardner suggests that a real 'I' is necessary to comprehend this valuing. Nietzschean valuing goes beyond simple valuation of oneself. It is not just that what is of value is oneself, but that one is of value when one creates one's values. Thus, although what we value is partly constitutive of who we are, there must be something that creates and legislates value in the first place. For Gardner, this is the 'I'. It is the "*formal* [condition] for valuing" (2009: p.8). It is not that the 'I' is *valued*, it is that

the 'I' is necessary *for valuing*. Gardner claims that if we cannot conceive of ourselves as valuing in this way then self-alienation looms large.

> "While it is true that there is no inconsistency between *our* thinking of some individual as bearing value on account of their psychological structure, if that individual is to think of *himself* as bearing value, then the I-conception is indispensable: Nietzschean man must set value on *himself*, not on some psychological structure." (Gardner, 2009: p.9)

The view seems to be the following. An individual is valuable when or because they create their own values. Thus, one can only view oneself as valuable if one views oneself as creating one's values. In order to view oneself as such, "the I-conception is indispensable". Value must be seen as issuing from oneself and not just a psychological structure. Self-alienation is a problem here because, as with Leiter, the psychological structure of an individual is conceived of as distinct from the self. Psychological structures are not selves, but pertain to selves. Although we can see how the values of others issue from their psychological structure, if we view ourselves in this way we become self-alienated. We cannot view ourselves as the creators of our values. Gardner also suggests that if we conceive of our values as just the expression of our psychological structures then we cannot justify these values. They can only be justified as *our* values if they result from *our* creative act of valuing (Gardner, 2009: p.16). The ultimate claim Gardner makes is that even if our values are wholly determined by our psychological structures, we cannot value ourselves if we *self-consciously* view our acts of valuing in this way. We must view our*selves* as the determiners of value and this necessarily involves an "I-conception" (Gardner, 2009: p.9). Nietzsche's theoretical rejection of the self and 'I' therefore appears to contradict his practical account of valuing.

Gardner next explores the theoretical account of selfhood that Nietzsche requires to avoid this contradiction. Nietzsche need not reject some kind of transcendental self. Kant argued that a transcendental self is necessary for the subjective unification of representations (C: B132). Through his analysis of the 'I' he concluded that this self was simple and identical. However, it exists transcendentally as a necessary logical function for thought. We cannot move from an a priori analysis of the 'I' to the conclusion that we are necessarily constituted by a *substantial* self that is simple,

identical and eternal. Kant provides a notion of selfhood placed between Platonic understandings of the self as soul and Humean-style rejection of selfhood. Gardner suggests that Nietzsche requires a similar notion of selfhood and that he could have coherently rejected Kant's further thinking whilst retaining a transcendental self. However, Nietzsche does in fact reject transcendental selfhood (Gardner, 2009: p.12).

Nietzsche also requires a notion of selfhood that simultaneously captures two ideas. Firstly, the self and its values are determined by an underlying psychological structure. Secondly, the self cannot be reduced to this structure or parts of it and its role is to unify the psychological manifold. The self and its values are the expression of a psychological structure, but we are conscious of such expression as belonging to and coming from our*selves.* Again, Nietzsche does not offer a theoretical conception of selfhood that captures this thinking (Gardner, 2009: p.12-15).

The vehemence of Nietzsche's theoretical rejection of selfhood leads Gardner to posit the impossibility of reconciling his theoretical and practical philosophy. Through a meta-philosophical analysis, Gardner claims that this inconsistency was deliberate. Nietzsche can be read "as *diagnosing* the disunity in philosophical reason, *identifying* it as marking our philosophical horizon, and *displaying* it for the benefit of our self-understanding" (Gardner, 2009: p.22). There are two arguments for this claim. The negative argument follows Gardner's attempts to unify Nietzsche's reasoning. Concluding that this is impossible, a reason for the inconsistency is put forward. The positive argument moves beyond selfhood. Gardner's theory is that Nietzsche's whole philosophy aimed to display the disunity of philosophical reason. This is apparently most evident in *On the Genealogy of Morals (GM)* III-28. Gardner claims that this section abandons the largely naturalistic analysis of morality provided throughout *GM.* Here Nietzsche does not examine humanity's search for meaning in a genealogical, historical or psychological context. He does not attempt to provide an origin of this need. Our search for meaning appears to be an essential practical problem for humanity throughout time. Gardner's "contention is therefore that Nietzsche concludes the *Genealogy* with the affirmation that we have a need which points beyond nature and which renders a non-naturalistic self-conception inescapable" (Gardner, 2009: p.26). He further suggests that Nietzsche could not naturalise our search for meaning. If it was reduced to just another drive or consequence of our nature then Nietzsche would have to hold "that the need for [meaning] cannot be taken with philosophical seriousness", but Nietzsche clearly

treats this need seriously[3] (Gardner, 2009: p.28). Gardner still resists a transcendental or non-naturalistic reading of Nietzsche. He notes that Nietzsche held that there was nothing that makes a non-naturalistic self-conception correct or our need for something beyond nature rational or justified. Rather, this need is just a brute fact about humanity. This generates the inconsistency. Theoretically, we cannot justify a non-natural notion of selfhood or need for meaning. Practically, we cannot avoid such notions. Gardner claims that Nietzsche viewed this as the point at which philosophical reflection halts, we cannot overcome this disunity of reason. So Nietzsche's theoretical-practical inconsistency is both real and deliberate. It highlights the point at which the modern philosophical mind has arrived and will not move beyond (Gardner, 2009: p.26-29).

3.2 A Philosophy of the Future

There are three problems with Gardner's theory. Firstly, it is a strange claim to make that if our search for meaning can be naturalised or explained in terms of drives it would lack philosophical seriousness. Naturalising a phenomenon does not entail that it becomes uninteresting. As Gardner notes, most of *GM* provides a complex naturalistic explanation of our moral systems so as to reveal their lack of metaphysical warrant. This does not reduce Nietzsche's interest in these systems. Gardner's worry is perhaps that our search for meaning cannot be *explained away*. There is no theoretical philosophy that will make us give up the search. Again, it is unclear as to why naturalising this search would reduce its force. Explaining a desire in social, historical or psychological terms does not entail that the desire ceases to operate, or that it *should* do. Lastly, Nietzsche acknowledges that even if our erroneous views about morality are exposed, we are creatures of habit. Our common conceptions of such phenomenon are so ingrained that we do not simply relinquish them after reading Nietzsche. Nietzsche may agree that the I-conception is ineliminable. His insight is to explain why it comes to exist and becomes ineliminable *within* a certain conceptual and moral system. This system is a contingent fabrication and *is* eliminable. This leads to the second objection.

[3] Nietzsche rejects the ascetic ideal as a solution to the problem of meaning, but also aims to provide us with a new solution (GM: II-24, III-28).

To a certain extent Nietzsche wanted to highlight the disunity of reason within modern philosophy. However, this comes at an earlier stage to his practical philosophy. The disunity of the modern mind is due to the death of God and other metaphysical realities. Here we find an instance of *GM* III-28's suicidal nihilism. We hold onto our search for metaphysical meaning, but find no metaphysical realities (May, 2009: p.100-103). Life becomes meaningless. Nietzsche's practical philosophy is supposed to overcome this nihilism. We will later see that this overcoming *requires* that we abandon our search for anything beyond reality. Nietzsche's practical philosophy may not be the best way of finding meaning in the world. Furthermore, it may be inconsistent with his theoretical philosophy. This does not mean that he was not trying to move beyond the philosophy of his time. In *Ecce Home (EH)*, Nietzsche incredulously jokes that "the 'Nationalzeitung'…could in all seriousness understand [*BGE*] as a 'sign of the times'" (EC: *Books*-1). This mistake is just one of the many "sins that had been committed against [*BGE*]" (EC: *Books*-1).

Finally, Gardner is too limited in his attempts to unify Nietzsche's thought. His attempt concentrates on what Nietzsche requires at a theoretical level for his practical philosophy to make sense. He rightly concludes that the theoretical resources are not available. The possibility that Nietzsche's practical philosophy does not require what he theoretically rejects is not explored in detail. Nevertheless, Gardner's initial worries about Nietzsche's notion of valuing requiring a real self still stand. However, rather than invoking the apparently forgotten possibility of Kantian transcendentalism, we can locate this self in our psychological structures alone. First, we must tackle Stern's theory of deliberate inconsistency.

3.3 Unstable Foundations

When Nietzsche scholars talk of psychological structures or subpersonal facts they tend to have Nietzschean drives on their minds. Stern (2015) has claimed the following.

1) Nietzsche does not have a coherent account of drives.
2) Drives cannot therefore explain Nietzsche's account of mind, consciousness, self, or the relationship between thought and action.
3) Drives cannot therefore underpin Nietzsche's positive ethics. (Stern, 2015: p.121)

Stern suggests that a coherent account of drives is lacking because Nietzsche's psychological project is to highlight different ways of attacking the "Socratic picture" of action (Stern, 2015: p.122). This picture is that we can (i) choose between different actions, (ii) weigh up our options for action, (iii) act according to the option that we think is right, (iv) know the motivations of our actions and (v) be morally judged on the basis of our decisions (Stern, 2015: p.122). Nietzsche's various attacks on this picture, it is claimed, neither come from nor develop a positive psychology (Stern, 2015: p.123). To search for a positive psychology therefore misses the point of Nietzsche's psychological analyses. I will suggest that Nietzsche's account of selfhood is underpinned by his account of drives so we must refute Stern's claims. I will undertake an analysis of the textual examples that Stern offers to support his charge of incoherence. We will see that the charge is unwarranted. We will also see that Nietzsche suggests that his account of drives is meant to underpin his account of selfhood and goes beyond an attack on the Socratic picture.

Stern argues that Nietzsche's account of drives is incoherent because he provides explicitly inconsistent answers to the following questions.

a) What are drives?
b) How much can we know about drives?
c) What is the relationship between drives and conscious deliberation, especially in consideration of accounting for action? (Stern, 2015: p.123)

Here I will argue against Stern's treatment of questions (a) and (b). Nietzsche's account of consciousness will be explored later and it is there that I shall tackle (c).

Stern notes that besides drives, Nietzsche includes in his psychology: tendencies, affects and instincts. Instincts tend to be aligned with drives, but tendencies and affects appear to be distinct psychological features. Stern suggests a drive (or instinct) is best understood as a "nonconscious urge or guiding power that makes a person act in a way that *seems* rational and purposive but that is not in fact (consciously) rational or purposive" (Stern, 2015: p.124). Stern also suggests that drives are broadly aligned with biological needs. Tendencies are dispositions, tastes, inclinations or propensities and often do not appear to be a result of biological needs. For example, one might have a disposition for democracy. Affects are understood as powerful emotional

stirrings. Such stirrings may not endure in the way that tendencies or drives do. These distinctions might sketch some kind of psychological system. Stern notes the categories that Nietzsche sometimes puts psychological phenomena into. Species-preservation may be seen as a biological drive. The desire for democracy could be a tendency. Anger might be an affect. Stern objects to such a clear account of Nietzschean psychology. (Stern, 2015: p.124-126)

3.4 Drastically Incomplete Psychology

Stern claims that the above psychological picture is "drastically incomplete - for two reasons" (Stern, 2015: p.126). The first problem arises when one notes that Nietzsche's notion of a drive comes from natural history. Animal action may sometimes seem purposive and rational, but conscious rationality and purposiveness are lacking. Thus, action is explained in terms of drives rather than conscious deliberation. However, humans appear to engage in self-conscious deliberation. Humans actually *are* purposive and rational (Stern, 2015: p.126). If drives explain behaviour that does not involve conscious deliberation, we need to know how they relate to conscious deliberative processes. There are two replies here.

Firstly, Stern himself claims that Nietzsche attempts to deal with this problem. Ultimately, Stern suggests that Nietzsche's solution is not consistent. However, this is a different problem to the one highlighted above. That Nietzsche's understanding and use of drives motivates the problem of consciousness only makes such an understanding "*drastically* incomplete" if no attempt at completion is made. An attempt is made and will be explored later.

Secondly, Stern claims that "one could not apply the same explanations of nonconscious behavior to beings with consciousness" (Stern, 2015: p.126). This is because conscious deliberation prima facie appears to play a role in causing or influencing human behaviour. Stern begs the question here. Consider Nietzsche's understanding of the 'problem of consciousness'.

> "The problem of consciousness…confronts us only when we begin to comprehend how we could dispense with it; and now physiology and the history of animals place us at the beginning of such comprehension…We could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also 'act' in every sense of that word, and yet none of all this would have to 'enter our

> consciousness'…The whole of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in the mirror." (GS: 354)

Consciousness is a problem within a human drive psychology precisely because it isn't necessary for acting or thinking. So Nietzsche needs to determine the role of consciousness in human life. Here we can refer back to the first point.

Stern's second problem is that Nietzsche's work does not support a clean division of psychological forces. This splits into two points. Firstly, Nietzsche uses different psychological terms to label the same phenomena.

> "Nietzsche *does*…refer to revenge as a 'drive', 'affect' and consequence of an affect; elsewhere 'revenge' is a nonunivocal term that can mask fear (or desire for honor) as the *real* motive. Yet, fear itself…is variously a drive, affect, or a 'feeling' that encourages a drive to act…Anger can be a drive or an affect; it can also be a neutral state of affairs that a drive can interpret in order to express itself." (Stern, 2015: p.126)

An analysis of the examples here will show that Nietzsche's labelling of drives is not nearly as incoherent as Stern claims.

Nowhere does Nietzsche claim that revenge, anger or fear *are* drives. Rather, we have drives *to* revenge, anger or fear. Stern allows Nietzsche an unproblematic equating of instincts and drives. In *Twilight of the Idol*'s *(TI)* Expeditions-3, Nietzsche speaks of "Rousseau's instinct for revenge"[4]. Revenge here is not an instinct or drive. Rather, Rousseau is said to have an instinct *for* or drive *to* revenge. Drives do not stand in any conceptual opposition or contradiction to affects, results, states of affairs, actions, and so on. Stern's deeper worry is that we cannot get a handle on the drive to revenge because we don't have a consistent account of revenge. Stern's examples do not sufficiently support this claim. Taking 'Anger', Stern suggests that it can be either a drive or an affect, but does not offer specific examples. Regardless,

[4] Stern (2015: p.126) references "TI 'Skirmishes' 6" as a section in which revenge appears. I find no mention of revenge or *rache* in the Hollingdale translation or eKGWB. eKGWB - Published Works - *Götzen-Dämmerung* - 'Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen' - 3, contains the closest reference to *"Rache*" as an "*Instinkt*".

I am inclined to agree and the argument above should alleviate inconsistency here. He offers *Daybreak (D)* 119 as evidence that anger can be a neutral state of affairs open to interpretation.

> "[A drive] regards every event of the day with a view to seeing how it can employ it for the attainment of its goal; whether a man is moving, or resting, or angry or reading or speaking or fighting or rejoicing, the drive will in its thirst as it were taste every condition into which the man may enter, and as a rule will discover nothing for itself there and will have to wait and go on thirsting."

Anger is not a neutral state of affairs here. It is a specific state that a drive "tastes". Stern may get to neutral because of the other states mentioned. Moving, reading and even fighting may not carry with them determinate feelings. However, we also have the inclusion of rejoicing and there is no need for us to read these different 'events' as the same kind of thing. Nietzsche's point is that any of these different events can be tasted by a drive. At this point, the drive finds nothing. Anger is so specific that the drive cannot interpret it in a way that provides an opportunity for expression. There is no suggestion that this event cannot be understood as the experience of an affect. This passage does not generate any more inconsistency than the drive or affect inconsistency which has already been resolved.

According to Stern, fear "is variously a drive, affect, or a 'feeling' that encourages a drive to act" (Stern, 2015: p.126). We learn of "the *instinct of fear*" (GS: 355), that "the cause-creating drive [can be] conditioned and excited by the feeling of fear" (TI: *Errors*-5), that drives can "blend with the depressive emotions, with suspicion, fear, dishonour" (TI: *Expeditions*-45), and that we have a "fear of disgrace" (D: 109). We have seen that I can have a drive to fear and fear can be an affect. Stern characterises affects as feelings or emotional stirrings (Stern, 2015: p.125). It is hard to see the conceptual opposition between fear being an affect and fear being a feeling which can initiate or condition action. Fear can be an affect that is just felt, but it may also influence action. Stern misses the possible problems with the "*instinct of fear*". It does not refer to a drive *to* fear, but an instinct that is activated *by* fear. On feeling fear, one instinctually attempts to reduce that feeling by overcoming or avoiding the cause of the fear. This is why we desire knowledge. Fearful of something unfamiliar,

we attempt to reduce it "to something *familiar*" (GS: 355). Here we seem to have a drive *away* from fear. This is activated by a feeling of fear so Nietzsche calls it "the *instinct of fear*". Fear is easily understood as an affect that can interact with drives.

We have seen one example of the instinct of revenge from *TI. The Gay Science (GS)* 49 mentions revenge as an act, but also speaks of a drive to revenge, "*Rachetriebes*", and a thirst for revenge, "*Rachedurstes*". *Human, All Too Human (HH),* I-138, has revenge as an action, but also "*Rachebedürfnisses*", a need or "thirst for revenge". *HH* WS-33 suggests that 'Revenge' is just a "pocket into which now this, now that, now several things at once have been put!" Again, we can make a coherent, non-oppositional distinction between a drive to revenge and revenge as an act. 'Thirst' and 'need' may be equivalent to 'drive'. These are not psychological occurrences that figure substantially in their own right throughout Nietzsche's psychology. Thirst is often used, but metaphorically so. On the other hand, thirst seems much more temporary than the standard interpretation of a drive. A need may also be relatively fleeting. So we could understand Nietzsche as positing an 'affect to revenge'. This is not to say that revenge *is* an affect. The idea is that we can desire revenge due to a fleeting feeling rather than an enduring drive. This will be explored in my last reply to Stern's worry. So far we are not struggling to understand what 'revenge' is. It is an act that one might perform because of an enduring drive or brief desire for vengeance. *HH* WS-33 is more problematic. 'Revenge' is just a word that can refer to all sorts of things. Acts of revenge can be committed out of self-preservation, desires to hurt, desires for restitution, in order to restore one's honour and in order to prove one's lack of fear for one's opponent. Nietzsche broadly speaks of two species of action here, revenge as self-preservation and revenge as a desire to hurt. This second species is gradually collapsed into the demonstration of one's fearlessness. Nietzsche is ambiguous about what this collapsing amounts to as he states that it is only for "some people that the danger to themselves involved in revenge…counts as an indispensable condition of the revenge" (HH: WS-33). Given Nietzsche's key idea, that revenge is committed for a variety of reasons, it seems as though he has in mind more than two species of action. Furthermore, when he discusses the revenge of society, punishment, he suggests that such revenge is performed in order to both self-preserve and deter future opponents (HH: WS-33). Despite its many potential causes, 'revenge' is understood as a unique kind of act, the performing of a "counter-blow" (HH: WS-33). The problem is not that there is no

such thing as an act of revenge, but that there doesn't seem to be a *drive* to revenge because revenge is just an expression of, for example, the drive to self-preservation. However, a drive to revenge can be included in our mental economy as *one of many* potential drives that can express themselves with vengeful acts. Nietzsche's aim is to draw up a *non-exhaustive* list of the motivational forces that *may* be at work in a *specific* act. The further aim is to suggest that in committing acts of revenge we are often ignorant of the forces at play. This does not preclude the notion that one can be motivated to minister a counter-blow for the 'simple reason' of acting in such a way. Just as one may have a drive to experience specific affects, one may have a drive to perform specific actions. Thus, Rousseau can be said to have a drive to revenge in that he seeks opportunities for administering counter-blows. Perhaps he sought opportunities for viewing himself as under attack so that he could *react* to such attacks. This is different to seeking opportunities for violence or self-preservation which are not necessarily reactive. Positing a *drive* to revenge does not commit us or Nietzsche to the claim that *acts* of revenge or the *concept* of revenge have a single "conceptual or perceptional root" (HH: WS-33). The conceptual roots of revenge are manifold. When we call an act 'revenge' we wrongly think that we thereby uncover a single motivational force. That an act is a counter-blow does not mean that it is motivated by the drive to revenge, but neither does it mean that it cannot have been so motivated. We cannot interpret this passage in isolation. Given that Nietzsche mentions the drive to revenge elsewhere and that this passage does not explicitly refute the existence of such a drive, there is no *overriding* reason to charge Nietzsche with inconsistency regarding revenge.

A final point should dissuade a Stern-style reading of other ambiguous passages. Stern accuses Nietzsche of a problematic "overlapping labelling" of psychological phenomena (Stern, 2015: p.126). I have suggested that this does not occur to a worrying extent. Here we can allow Stern more than he should be allowed. We should still struggle to see why this is uniquely problematic for a coherent account of Nietzschean psychology. Take someone who desires to have sex with their partner. We could explain this in a number of ways. Firstly, they might have an active biological instinct to procreate. Secondly, they might have a tendency to desire sex. They may be disposed to desire as much sex as possible. Finally, they might be momentarily sexually attracted to their partner and have a fleeting desire to have sex with them. The point is that very similar psychological phenomena cannot always be

understood in exactly the same way. One person might be an 'angry person' disposed to constantly become angry, another might be a 'calm person' racked by a sudden fit of anger. There is no reason why Nietzsche must suggest that anger or sexual desire must always be the result of or constituted by *either* a biological drive *or* a tendency *or* an affect and that they cannot be understood in different ways at different times in different people. A highly rigorous account of psychology may be able to carefully label phenomena. Perhaps sexual desire should be labelled differently to a need to procreate. However, the most we can accuse Nietzsche of here is sloppiness rather than incoherence. He may not be systematic and rigorous enough by analytic standards. His labelling may require a bit of interpretation and unpacking, but we can still get at what Nietzsche may be claiming at different times. I am not suggesting that Nietzsche uses his labels interchangeably such that in a given instance of anger he may call it an affect or drive or disposition, but that these labels explain essentially the same phenomenon (Stern, 2015: p.127). The point is that they do not explain the exact same phenomenon. The *cause* of a sexual desire can be understood in different ways depending on the subject. A different label does not describe the same kind of thing as any other label even though the result of a biological need or sudden affect may be the same. A drive to anger and the affect of anger are not the same thing. However, we and Nietzsche may sometimes become confused or terminologically sloppy because both the drive and affect might be phenomenologically and motivationally similar. This approach easily overcomes Stern's worry that interchangeable labels cannot account for the fact that drives may be opposed to affects, affects may be socially attached to certain drives, and so on (Stern, 2015: p.127-8). I maintain the distinction between different psychological phenomena so that they can interact with each other. An individual may even feel anger (affect) at the fact that they have a drive towards anger.

Stern's additional charge of incompleteness highlights the vast amount of things that Nietzsche labels as drives. Some drives seem to have no natural biological basis, others don't seem to occur in all humans and some seem to presuppose or require consciousness. The upshot of this for Stern is that Nietzsche provides no account of what ties all of these things together. There is no "common point of reference" (Stern, 2015: p.128). In section 4.1 I will develop the following definition of drives.

Drive: A relatively enduring disposition that aims to engage an individual in a certain activity and manifests itself regardless of environmental or subjective stimuli by informing an individual's perception of objects, generating evaluative orientations towards objects and bringing about action.[5]

This definition does not contradict any of Stern's important considerations. It allows us to include in the pantheon of drives: biological needs, socially inherited dispositions, dispositions that we are conscious of, dispositions that require consciousness (though not autonomous conscious control), dispositions that not all humans have, and so on. There are two things to clarify.

Stern initially distinguishes between tendencies or dispositions (*Hang*) and drives (*Instinkt* or *Triebe*). This could block a dispositional drive definition. Nietzsche's notion of a drive is taken from natural history. This is why Stern is happy to broadly equate drives with instincts. When Nietzsche uses *Hang*, it often denotes dispositions that don't tend to have a recognisable biological basis (Stern, 2015: p.124-5). However, Stern also notes that Nietzsche appears to use *Hang*, *Instinkt* and *Triebe* interchangeably. Thus, the only block to a dispositional drive definition is a *purely* biological interpretation of drives. Stern thinks we should reject such an interpretation because even some Nietzschean instincts appear to be non-biological (Stern, 2015: p.127). This suggests that *Triebe* can be interpreted as interchangeable with both *Hang* and *Instinkt*. Some drives have a biological basis, others do not. Contrary to Stern, this does not amount to the blocking of a coherent account of drives. Rather, we should simply be hesitant to interpret the broad notion of Nietzschean drives as naturalistic in the sense that they always have a *biological* basis. By Stern's own lights, rejecting a purely biological understanding of drives would not be ad hoc after defining drives dispositionally because some instincts also appear to be non-biological. This leads to the second point.

Contextually and textually it is relatively clear that Nietzsche takes the notion of a drive from natural history. This does not mean that Nietzsche's conception of drives does not move beyond such an understanding. There are distinctly human drives

[5] That drives aim at specific activities and manifest themselves regardless of stimuli precludes dispositional beliefs, concepts, and so on, from being understood as drives. Even on a functional, dispositional view of belief, my belief that lions are dangerous only manifests itself and initiates action if I perceive a lion approaching me.

within Nietzsche's pantheon. Whether or not such drives can be read naturalistically or have a biological basis, Nietzsche has a unique understanding of drives and does not obviously tether himself to any prior understanding of the term.

That Nietzsche labels so many things as drives may be problematic, we might disagree with his analysis of the mind and action. Furthermore, Nietzsche may never give us an explicit definition of drives. However, none of this makes his account of drives fundamentally incoherent or blocks the move to find the unifying characteristics of drives.

3.5 The Epistemology of Drives

Stern's next worry focuses on our knowledge of drives.

> "I know of no attempt at an explanation anywhere in the literature - Nietzsche's or secondary - as to how Nietzsche can both hold that drive activity is in great part nonconscious, unknowable to individuals, and necessarily poorly conceptualized *and* claim intricate knowledge of the workings of the drives of others." (Stern, 2015: p.129)

Nietzsche is sceptical about self-knowledge. He claims that: "However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing…can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of *drives* that constitute his being" (D: 119). This is influenced by Nietzsche's idea that "the greatest part of our spirit's activity remains unconscious and unfelt" (GS: 333). However, Nietzsche goes further than disparaging remarks about the possibility of self-knowledge. For two reasons, the linguistic conceptualisation of drives often, if not always, involves a degree of falsification. Firstly, it is only the extreme mental phenomena that arise to consciousness. Much else occurs below the surface which, unaware of it, we cannot linguistically conceptualise (D: 115). Secondly, linguistic concepts arise out of the need to communicate within society. The generation of language is the generation of a *shared* sign-language. The concept of anger designates a shared state, one that we can all experience. However, "all our actions are incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual" (GS: 354). As knowledge is based on our linguistic concepts, we can only ever come to know "what is not individual but 'average'" (GS: 354. TL: 1). This 'knowledge' fails to properly capture the causes of our actions.

Nietzsche's claims about *self*-knowledge are unproblematic. Just because it is subjectively difficult to ascertain the exact machinations of our minds it does not follow that an outside observer will face the *same* challenges. Furthermore, Nietzsche's aspersions on self-knowledge are not largely concerned with our knowledge of basic desires or superficial reasons for action or belief. They are focused on knowledge of deeper, underlying psychological processes. Stern rejects an appeal to Nietzsche's claim that he is a "psychologist who has not his equal" (EH: *Books*-5). However, such a psychologist is surely warranted to make claims about the mind that most individuals cannot because of their psychological ignorance. This is so even if other-knowledge is also difficult for the majority of individuals. Nietzsche may not have been a great psychologist, but that he sees himself in this way shows why he does not consider aspersions on self-knowledge to constitute a block on *his* psychological knowledge.

The more pressing problem is that the conceptualisation of drives at least often falsifies those drives and fails to capture the mind's subtleties. This does appear to contradict Nietzsche's liberal labelling of drives and claims of deep psychological understanding. However, Nietzsche does *not* claim knowledge of the specificities of the milder forces that work beneath the consciously experienced extreme forces. He does not attempt to name or conceptualise them. His claim to knowledge is that milder forces are undoubtedly at work despite our ignorance of the details. As they work beneath consciousness, this does no harm to his view that unknown psychological forces are often the real causes of action rather than conscious deliberation[6]. In *D* 115, Nietzsche states that "anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain - all are names for *extreme* states". Nietzsche is aware that much of his psychological analysis deals in phenomena that only capture part of the story. This does not prevent him from providing insightful and subversive commentary on the history of our actions and beliefs because our self-knowledge often confuses, misses and wrongly interprets even these extreme states. Nietzsche claims that "where words are lacking, we are accustomed to abandon exact observation because exact thinking here becomes painful; indeed, in earlier times one involuntarily concluded that where the realm of words ceased the realm of existence ceased also" (D: 115). Nietzsche suggests that we must at least accept that psychological existence continues beyond our ken. We

[6] Conscious deliberation is explored in section 4.3.

can then attempt to painfully think about this unknown and the *consequences* of such an unknown existence. We can read Nietzsche as doing the best he can with linguistic tools. His claims about falsifying conceptualisation are admittances of the limitations of his psychological analyses. Nevertheless, though he may miss the mark when labelling a drive, *a* drive still exists. This may also account for the vast amount of drives and ways of describing them. Nietzsche can be seen as trying, again and again, to get a more accurate picture of drives. He views them in different ways, offers different explanations of their behaviour and origins, and so on, in the hope of reaching a more comprehensive understanding. He is capable of dissecting the extreme states to a degree. His analyses of pity, compassion, revenge, knowledge, and so on, go beyond our blunt and superficial understanding. However, he is aware that more could always be said, or if not said, acknowledged.

3.6 The Socratic Picture

Stern claims that despite his lack of a coherent psychological theory, "Nietzsche did have…a very clear picture of the target he wanted to attack" (Stern, 2015: p.122). This target is the Socratic picture of action.

The sole aim of Nietzsche's psychological analyses is to attack the Socratic picture and to do this he does not need to provide a coherent theory of his own. Consistency cannot and *should not* be found because it misconstrues Nietzsche's goal. This suggestion doesn't get off the ground. We saw above the idea that drives constitute our being. Elsewhere we learn that a philosopher's "morality bears decided and decisive evidence to *who he is* - that is to say, to the order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relative to one another" (BGE: 6). Furthermore, the soul should be conceived of "as [a] social structure of the drives and emotions" (BGE: 12). This has implications for Nietzsche's practical philosophy that focuses on affirming one's being and becoming what one is (GS: 270, 335. TSZ: *Honey Offering*). It is unclear what Stern would make of these moments. He claims that "it is often suggested" that Nietzsche bases his account of self and mind on the drives (Stern, 2015: p.121). Drives thereby provide the foundation for his practical philosophy. Stern seems to see these suggestions as the suggestions of scholars. It is clear that Nietzsche makes such suggestions himself, hence the scholarly attention. Despite the focus of his paper, Stern must at least suggest an alternative basis for Nietzsche's account of self and practical philosophy.

We are yet to see if Nietzsche has a coherent account of drive-based selfhood that supports his practical work. However, we can see that Nietzsche does conceive of drives as of great importance to an understanding of who we are. Even if Nietzsche ultimately fails to provide a coherent account of drives, we are warranted in our search for one.

4 - Drives and Consciousness

4.1 Drives as Dispositions

Nietzsche provides no precise definition of a drive. This ambiguity is interpretively translated into defining drives as anything from politically related homunculi (Thiele, 1990: p.57) to naturalistically articulated dispositions (Richardson, 2004: p.38-39). Drives will be central to my account of Nietzschean selfhood and we therefore require a stable drive definition. The aim here is to arrive at a definition that is congruous with Nietzsche's text and my interpretation of Nietzschean selfhood. Katsafanas' (2016) recent exploration of drives provides a useful foundation for this endeavour. I will highlight some textual objections and corrections to the details of his analysis, but I otherwise follow Katsafanas' understanding of drives as a certain type of disposition.

Drives appear to be motivational states, urges or cravings. Stern finds only one reference to hunger as a drive in Nietzsche's published work (D: 119), but it is states like hunger that drives bring to mind (Stern, 2015: p.126). However, drives evaluate the world (HH: I-32) and have perspectives (NF-1885: 1-58. NF-1886: 7-60). Nietzsche even tells us that drives "have all at some time or other practised philosophy - and that each one of them would be only too glad to present *itself* as the ultimate goal of existence and as the legitimate *master* of all the other drives. For every drive is tyrannical: and it is as *such* that it tries to philosophize" (BGE: 6). Drives appear to exhibit agential abilities in that we commonly think of only self-conscious agents as being capable of evaluation and philosophy. (Katsafanas, 2016: p.78-80)

This leads to the homunculi view of drives as "agents-within-agents" (Katsafanas, 2016: p.80). Katsafanas canvasses a few versions of this interpretation and notes some philosophical objections to it (2016: p.80-83). For our purposes, the important

objection is that the homunculi reading is incongruous with Nietzsche's project regarding agency and selfhood. Nietzsche "condemned himself to *inventing* [a] new" conception of self after rejecting the traditional notion of a soul (BGE: 12). Perhaps this new conception was simply the idea that we are made up of many selves rather than one. This would amount to a fundamental acceptance of the traditional conception of selfhood and agency. The claim would simply be that more agents exist within each individual than we previously thought. However, Nietzsche argues that our conception of selfhood and agency is drastically mistaken. (Katsafanas, 2016: p.84)

The opposite interpretation is the disposition view of drives. For example, Janaway has suggested "that a drive is a relatively stable tendency to active behaviour of some kind" (Janaway, 2007: p.214). I will defend this view, but it needs finessing. Not all dispositions are drives, but drives are a species of disposition. They are dispositions that evaluate and have perspectives on the world.

Richardson suggests that "a Nietzschean drive is a disposition that was selected for a certain result; the result is its individuating goal, which explains its presence and its character" (Richardson, 2004: p.39). Following this, "a drive's values are precisely the goals it drives toward"[7] (Richardson, 2004: p.13). Katsafanas objects that being disposed towards sexual activity does not always amount to valuing such activity. For example, an ascetic might not value sexual activity despite being naturally disposed towards it (Katsafanas, 2016: p.85).

Our elucidatory project at present is to understand how *drives* evaluate. Katsafanas' criticism is that an *individual's* values can come apart from the goals of *some* of their dispositions. However, Richardson is not claiming that a drive evaluates because an individual values its end. The claim is that the value *of a drive* is the goal to which it disposes the individual in which it inheres. Katsafanas needs to show that a drive's value can come apart from the goal towards which it strives. As Richardson equates such things, on this analysis, no separation can occur. With the preceding amendment, we have an ascetic with a sex drive that values sex, but the ascetic does not value sex. Katsafanas' problem seems to be that because Nietzsche says our

[7] We can remain agnostic about Richardson's Darwinian characterisation of drives whilst holding onto this understanding of the values of drives.

values come from our drives, the ascetic must value sex. However, drives can be opposed to each other.

> "While 'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive *which is complaining about another*; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the *vehemence* of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive." (D: 109)

Katsafanas' objection only succeeds if the ascetic has no drives that might be opposed to sexual activity, but this is an absurd suggestion. An individual's values are not determined by all of their drives at once, but by dominant drives. Drives aim to master each other and it is when a drive achieves mastery that it succeeds in presenting "*itself* [and its value] as the ultimate goal of existence" (BGE: 6). Katsafanas could suggest that the good ascetic does not struggle with his sex drive, but simply disvalues sex. We can turn here to another key idea.

> "Every moment of our lives sees some of the polyp-arms [(drives)] of our being grow and others of them wither, all according to the nutriment which the moment does or does not bear with it." (D: 119)

The strength of drives waxes and wanes. The weaker a drive, the less we are aware of it. Thus, the good ascetic, whilst having a natural sex drive, is relatively unmoved by it. His other drives are so successful in suppressing its expression that the ascetic *cannot* value sex.

The values of drives are the ends which drives seek. Individuals value certain ends depending on which drive or drives are dominant. Importantly, drives do not just respond to stimuli. When they are active, they seek expression.

> "Suppose a drive finds itself at the point at which it desires gratification…it then regards every event of the day with a view to seeing how it can employ it for the attainment of its goal…the drive will in its thirst as it were taste every condition into which the man may enter." (D: 119)

Often these conditions or events offer no obvious nourishment to the drive. So drives do not just *have* values, they *evaluate* situations in terms of their suitability for expression (D: 119). This involves perspectival interpretation. We can understand this in two ways.

Firstly, drives evaluate the world by altering the way we perceive it. When drives are strong enough, we are compulsively motivated to achieve their ends. We seek opportunities for such achievement. If a situation affords an opportunity it is evaluated positively, if not, negatively. Katsafanas, by lengthy and complicated analysis, cashes this out in terms of affective orientations (Katsafanas, 2016: p.95-106). It is relatively common to understand Nietzschean affects as being constituted *in part* by inclination or aversion towards some object (Katsafanas, 2016: p.103-4). Katsafanas suggests that drives evaluate the world by inducing affective orientations towards certain objects that amount to evaluations (Katsafanas, 2016: p.102). The above analysis fits with this idea and can be put in simple terms. When a drive is active it induces affective orientations towards objects that will satisfy it and vice versa. We thereby affectively perceive and evaluate the world in different ways depending on our active drives.

The second aspect of perspectival drives is more complicated. As drives constantly seek expression, Nietzsche is often interpreted as claiming that "drives do not *await* occasions for expression, but *create* them" (Katsafanas, 2016: p.100). One way they do this is to affectively incline us towards certain objects. However, they may go further than this. In *D* 119 Nietzsche notes that despite the fact that the nervous stimuli received when sleeping are relatively constant each night, we have a wide variety of dreams. This variety depends on the different drives that are active each night. The drive to "adventurousness" might 'create' an adventurous dream to satisfy itself (D: 119). Nietzsche claims that waking life, whilst not as free, is no different. Katsafanas interprets Nietzsche as claiming that drives alter the content of experience in order to incline "the agent to see certain actions as warranted" (Katsafanas, 2016: p.100). However, the second way that drives alter the content of experience is *explanatory* rather than *justificatory*.

Nietzsche claims that "drives…do nothing but interpret nervous stimuli and…posit their 'causes'" (D: 119). Katsafanas interprets 'cause' as 'justificatory warrant'. The claim is not that we consider ourselves justified in seeking situations to satisfy a drive, it is that we perceive the world as justifying certain responses that will

satisfy the drive. Drives "will induce an orientation that inclines the agent to take steps toward fulfilling the drive, by making it appear as if taking these steps is *warranted* by the situation" (Katsafanas, 2016: p.102). So if the drive to aggressiveness is active, we must find a reason for aggression before it can be satisfied. Leaving aside various notions and degrees of rational agency, we can see that this is wrong.

We do not need to perceive of situations as always warranting certain actions or responses. Consider two examples. Firstly, my drive to adventure is active. I see a mountain and decide to climb it. What warrants my climb is the very fact that I am feeling adventurous. The situation is useful, but ultimately redundant. The mountain does not rationally require exploration, I just want to explore it. If the mountain is tough, my drive is satisfied. However, this toughness explains rather than justifies my satisfaction. Second, consider dreams, Nietzsche's starting point. It seems almost absurd to suggest that in sleep I take warranted steps towards fulfilling a drive. My drive to music is active and I experience the beating of my eyelids on the pillow as an intricate rhythm. The drive is satisfied because I hear music, not because I have taken warranted steps to hear music. This uncovers the correct interpretation.

Whilst I sleep there is no music playing. Drives alter our perception of the world not by positing justification for their satisfaction, but explanatory causes for their activation and satisfaction. In dreams our imagination can run wild. In waking life we are limited, but we perceive the aspects of a situation that explain why we feel a certain way. Consider Nietzsche's laugher in the market. If the drive to reflection is active, the passer-by reflects on the nature of laughter (D: 119). This is not because the passer-by views the laughter as justifying reflection, but because they are in a reflective mood. One then posits the laughter as the cause of reflection. Nietzsche's insight is to suggest that the drive, not the laughter, is the real cause of our reflection. However, we falsely interpret it to the contrary. None of this is to say that we cannot view explanatory causes as justificatory, the point is that drives do not always need to make their satisfaction seem justified *by an event*.

We must turn finally to an understanding of the goals of drives. Drives constantly seek expression. They do not cease simply because they have gained momentary gratification.

> "The aim of a drive is its characteristic form of activity…In order for a drive to be expressed, one needs an object. The drive itself is indifferent to the object; the drive simply seeks expression. So the aggressive drive will seek to vent itself on whatever object happens to be present." (Katsafanas, 2016: p.101)

Drives aim to engage an individual in a certain activity. They seek to engage us in such activities indefinitely. The aim of the drive to knowledge is the acquisition of knowledge, whatever that knowledge may amount to. We must be careful with our understanding of *activity* so as to not overly focus on *specific actions*. A drive initiates action not *necessarily* because its goal is a specific act. We can engage in the characteristic activities of drives through a variety of actions. When starving, my drive to self-preservation motivates me to eat. In a fight, it motivates me to fight back. Despite Nietzsche's liberal labelling of drives, he never claims that *all* actions have a corresponding drive. Rather, our actions, beliefs, and so on, are explained by the ways in which different drives, via their characteristic activity, make us react to and interpret the world.

Drives are dispositions that motivate certain kinds of activity. The activities they motivate are seen as the drives' values and an individual's values reflect their dominant drives. Drives evaluate the world by making us perceive certain situations as offering or withholding opportunities for their satisfaction. Furthermore, drives make us perceive objects as causes of their activation and satisfaction, when in fact drives satisfy themselves through chance objects. Thus our definition of a drive.

Drive: A relatively enduring disposition that aims to engage an individual in a certain activity and manifests itself regardless of environmental or subjective stimuli by informing an individual's perception of objects, generating evaluative orientations towards objects and bringing about action.

4.2 The Function of Consciousness

We must now tackle Stern's worry about Nietzsche's treatment of consciousness. After examining Nietzsche's account of the function of consciousness, we will explore the relationship between drives and conscious deliberation.

Nietzsche's most prominent and clear analysis of consciousness is found in *GS* 354. In section 2.4 we saw that here Nietzsche claims all of life could occur without consciousness. Yet it does not. Nietzsche contends that consciousness, and self-consciousness, "*developed only under the pressure of the need for communication*" (GS: 354). To communicate our needs, we had to know what these needs were. Consciousness develops as a "net of communication between human beings" (GS: 354). Such communication has a linguistic form. With a shared linguistic sign-language we gained the "ability to fix" our feelings so that we could communicate them (GS: 354). Thus, "the development of language and the development of consciousness (*not* of reason but merely the way reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand" (GS: 354). The more words we invented to fix our feelings, the more we could know and think about ourselves. Nietzsche claims that "only…conscious thinking *takes the form of words*" (GS: 354). So consciousness is merely a linguistic awareness of oneself. The focus on conscious *thinking* is key here. Thinking is something we usually conceive of as only occurring consciously. However, for Nietzsche, thinking is "nothing but a *certain behaviour of the instincts toward one another*" (GS: 333), it is "only the relationship of…drives to one another" (BGE: 36). Thus, conscious thought is linguistic awareness of drive behaviour.

Katsafanas notes that, for Nietzsche, "words are sounds designating concepts" (BGE: 268) (Katsafanas, 2016: p.25). Consciousness is not a substantive faculty that allows for thinking, deliberation or reasoning. Rather, it is *conceptual* awareness of these and other phenomena. Consciousness is no more than a *property* of mental states (Katsafanas, 2016: p.21).

4.3 Conscious Deliberation

The above should assuage Stern's initial worries about Nietzsche's 'problem of consciousness'. Nietzsche explains human behaviour in terms of drives, but consciousness has a clear role in our lives and history. It is there to facilitate communication. However, perhaps Nietzsche is forgetting that consciousness might

have developed beyond its origins into a substantive faculty[8]. A careful reading of *GS* refutes this suggestion.

> "*Even now*…the greatest portion of our life actually takes place without this *mirror effect*." (GS: 354, emphasis added).

The fact that conscious thinking is simply thinking conceptualised "uncovers the origin of consciousness" (GS: 354). Nietzsche is working backwards from an observation of contemporary humanity.

Whatever the ambiguity surrounding drive definition, how they relate to conscious deliberation is perhaps the most important thing to understand. Stern claims that Nietzsche explicitly supports opposing ways in which drives relate to such deliberation.

> 1) "Overrule: The drives overrule our conscious deliberations.
> 2) Manipulate: The drives manipulate our conscious deliberations.
> 3) Epiphenomenalist: Only the drives are causally efficacious; our conscious deliberations are epiphenomenal.
> 4) Reductive: There aren't conscious deliberations, as we typically understand them, *at all*; there are only drives." (Stern, 2015: p.130)

(1) And (2) can be understood in three different ways: strong, weak and epistemic. Drives might *always* overrule or manipulate deliberations, drives might *sometimes* overrule or manipulate, or *we never know* if drives are overruling or manipulating. (1) - (3) hold that conscious deliberations and drives are different things. (4) holds that, essentially, they are not (Stern, 2015: p.130-32). All of these claims can in fact fit into a coherent psychology.

First, we must distinguish between two conceptions of conscious deliberation. Such deliberation could be the activity of drives. Alternatively, it might be the activity of something distinct from the drives **(X)**. We can elucidate these approaches in broadly Kantian or Humean terms.

[8] Nietzsche is sceptical about the existence or explanatory role of faculties (BGE: 11).

Consider the self-legislation of ends. For Kant, the will is "a faculty of self-determination, independent of the necessitation through sensible impulses [(drives)]" (C: B562). Whilst the will is affected by drives, it can suspend their influence as it is distinct from them. Deliberation is not *determined* by drives. Wood (1999, p.51) writes that, for Kant, "not only do rational beings have the capacity to resist impulses, but even when the rational faculty…acts on…impulses, it is never determined by them". Furthermore, an 'I' exists as a formal condition for thought and thought is an activity of this 'I' (C: B407). Conscious deliberation is the activity of an 'I' and the legislation of ends is performed by a will that is distinct from the drives.

For Hume, reason is a faculty that is a "slave of the passions [(drives)]" (Treatise: II-III-III). Reason is not constituted by and does not allow for the suspension of drive influence. It is a faculty that is used and controlled by drives. Our ends are legislated by drives, reason simply aids us in determining how to achieve these ends. This leads to two understandings of reasoning.

Firstly, reasoning may be considered the activity of deciding our ends. Secondly, reasoning may be the activity of ascertaining the best way of pursuing an end. Nietzsche is clear that the first kind of reasoning is accounted for by 'drive deliberation'. Drive deliberation is the interplay of drives such that the decision to tackle the vehemence of a drive is made by another drive (D: 109). Nietzsche views thought as the interaction of drives (GS: 333). In *GS* 354 we learn that reason *can* arise to consciousness, but being nothing more than the interaction of drives, can occur unconsciously. Here Nietzsche has in mind our first kind of reasoning, that of deciding *what* to do. He rejects the notion that such deliberation is performed by or requires an 'I' or will that is distinct from the drives (X).

The activity of deciding *how* to achieve an end *might* only occur consciously. Some means-end reasoning may require consciousness as it involves conceptual thought. We will soon see that drives can utilise concepts to achieve their ends. Here we can say that consciousness, as conceptual awareness of the world and ourselves, may provide us with the capacity for means-end reasoning. However, the way in which this capacity is used is determined by drives. The capacity is passive in and of itself. Means-end reasoning is viewed in a Humean light. "Mathematics…are useful in…almost every art and profession: But 'tis not of themselves they have any influence" (Treatise: II-III-III). The ways in which concepts, mathematical or otherwise, influence action are determined by drives. Means-end reasoning may

require consciousness, but it remains an *activity* of the drives. As consciousness amounts to conceptual awareness of psychological processes, means-end reasoning might not be a process that is *necessarily* conscious. Means-end reasoning may also occur unconsciously.

We can now better see the two understandings of conscious deliberation. Conscious deliberation may be the capacity to suspend the influence of drives and set oneself ends that are not determined by drives **(X-deliberation)**. Alternatively, conscious deliberation may amount to consciousness of drive deliberation. Means-end reasoning may require consciousness. However, it is still drives that deliberate as they utilise this capacity to achieve their ends.

X-deliberation is reductively eliminated by Nietzsche. There is no X, be it a faculty-will or 'I'. So there is no such thing as X-deliberation and it can be reduced to drive activity. Nevertheless, we have the concept and phenomenological experience of X-deliberation. The concept of X-deliberation is that an X exists which can suspend the influence of drives. The experience of X-deliberation is the feeling that one, as an X free from drive determination, is actually setting oneself ends. This is the target of Nietzsche's epiphenomenalist claims. The phenomenological experience of X-deliberation, whilst real given our false understanding of selfhood and deliberation, is epiphenomenal.

Conscious deliberation is efficacious when it amounts to consciousness of drive deliberation. We do not need to be conscious of this activity for a decision to be reached. However, we become conscious of the activity when it is linguistically conceptualised. Conscious deliberation is not reducible to *mere* drive behaviour because it is drive behaviour that we are conceptually aware of. However, its efficacy is reducible to the efficacy of drives. Importantly, not everything we are conscious of is efficacious. It is only when we are conscious of action or decision causing drives that conscious deliberation can be said to be efficacious. So consciousness can be efficacious in two ways.

a) Derivative: Conscious deliberation is efficacious when it amounts to awareness of efficacious drives.
b) Instrumental: Consciousness can be instrumentally efficacious as it provides the capacity for conceptual means-end reasoning.

The overrule and manipulation claims are therefore that, despite conscious deliberation's causal efficaciousness, nonconscious drives often manipulate and overrule conscious deliberations. This is because nonconscious drives work in much more varied, subtle and perhaps powerful ways than those of which we are conscious. We can accept weak versions of manipulate and overrule so that both can occur.

Retaining Stern's insights, we can say that Nietzsche sometimes discusses conscious deliberation on his own terms, as conceptual awareness of drive activity, and at others he discusses it in terms of X-deliberation that is free from drive determination. He may unsystematically move between these understandings of deliberation, but we can, with a little unpacking, find a coherent understanding of the relation between drives and conscious deliberation.

4.4 The Effect of Concepts

Efficacious conscious deliberation amounts to conceptual awareness of drive interplay. However, the concepts by which we become aware of ourselves can have an effect on our lives.

In *GM* II-16 Nietzsche explicates the "bad conscience". When humans came to live socially certain drives, such as the drives to "hostility [and] cruelty", were supressed (GM: II-16). However, these drives do not wither away. When "the external venting of human instinct has been *inhibited*" it turns inwards (GM: II-16). The social individual, "for want of external enemies and resistance impatiently tears, persecutes, gnaws, disturbs [and] mistreats himself". They have "no choice but to transform [themselves] into an adventure, a place of torture" (GM: II-16). This internal situation creates the "bad conscience" which is a "sickness" born out of "man's suffering *from man, from himself*" (GM: II-16).

When Christianity seizes society, this bad conscience is conceptualised as religious guilt. We become conscious of the bad conscience *as* guilt. This is a guilt about one's own nature. Our animal instincts are inimical to God, but we cannot rid ourselves of them. Thus, "man will find himself guilty…to a point beyond the possibility of atonement" (GM: II-22). This has three consequences. Firstly, because we suffer from guilt, our drive to cruelty seeks to increase our feeling of guilt, which is the bad conscience. Secondly, suffering has meaning. We suffer because we are guilty and deserve to be punished (GM: III-20). Finally, the guiltier we are, the more punishment we deserve. We seek more suffering as punishment and this again is an

expression of our drive to cruelty. "The bad conscience takes root, eating its way in, spreading down and out like a polyp" (GM: II-21).

Concepts can have profound consequences for our lives. We might be tempted to say that consciousness is efficacious *in its own right* because it is constituted by conceptual awareness. However, concepts are simply tools that drives use to express themselves and until they are seized by drives they are inert. One only internalises the concept of guilt and seeks further self-suffering if one's drive to cruelty is active and venting inwardly. 'Internalisation' refers to becoming self-conscious of oneself as guilty. If the drive to cruelty can vent outwardly, it has no need for the concept of guilt. For example, Ancient Greeks allowed their drives to cruelty sufficient external gratification that they did not need to make themselves suffer by conceiving of themselves as guilty (GM: II-23). Finally, concepts have their origins in long social histories. Thus, we, or our drives, do not have control over the concepts that are available to us. Drives have control over the internalisation of concepts and the uses to which they are put. "This man of bad conscience [assumes] control of the religious presupposition in order to carry his self-punishment to the most horrific pitch of harsh intensity" (GM: II-22).

We now have a framework in place for understanding Nietzschean selfhood.

5 - Nietzsche's Self

5.1 Anderson's Emergentism

We have seen a number of quotations from *BGE* 12 that suggest that Nietzsche aimed to redefine selfhood. The self is a "social structure of the drives and emotions [or affects]" (BGE: 12). This gives rise to three questions.

1) What kind of structure amounts to a self?
2) Why can this structure be called a self?
3) How does this understanding of selfhood fit with Nietzsche's practical philosophy?

Anderson (2012) has attempted to answer these questions. His nuanced paper highlights what we need from a drive-based account of Nietzschean selfhood. Most

notably, he captures Nietzsche's notion that the self is a *complex* structure of *interacting* drives. However, Anderson's notion of emergence is underdeveloped and misguided. After exploring Anderson's account, my objections to it will lay the foundations for a new account of Nietzschean selfhood.

Anderson aims to offer a conception of Nietzschean selfhood that is neither transcendentalist nor naturalistically reductionist. The transcendental approach can account for self-creation and the like, but there is little evidence for such a reading. Anderson accuses Gardner's argument of being "based primarily on an a priori argument identifying alleged presuppositions of Nietzschean positions, rather than any direct argument from Nietzsche's texts" (Anderson, 2012: p206). There is a wealth of evidence for a reductionist or eliminativist account. However, these approaches struggle to capture self-creation and also have their textual counter-evidence. Through his arguments against these types of account, Anderson draws out the kind of self that he is looking for.

a) Non-transcendental or metaphysical: The Nietzschean self is not a unified, identical entity existing as either a logical function or real substance.
b) Not eliminated: Nietzsche endorses some kind of self.
c) Non-reductionist: The Nietzschean self is both complex and not reducible to constituent parts. (Anderson, 2012: p.211-216)

Anderson suggests that "Nietzsche's agenda is to *change our conception* of the soul, not to get rid of it as an identifiable object of psychology over and above its subpersonal constituents" (Anderson, 2012: p.215). He then provides an account of drives and affects. There are a four key ideas. Firstly, drives and affects exist in functional relationships with each other. Due to differing, but mutually beneficial natures, they use each other. Drives use affects to achieve their goals in different ways. Affects use drives to provide more "telic shape" to habitual actions (Anderson, 2012: p.221). Secondly, this functional relationship means that drives and affects should not be understood as disconnected entities that occasionally, randomly interact. Specific drives and affects are bound to each other and to a given individual in virtue of the fact that they can recruit each other only because they exist within that individual. Thirdly, drives and affects can combine in certain ways to create more

complex drives or structures. Finally, when this happens, the more complex structure is a *distinct psychological object*, over and above its constituents. This is key for Anderson. He uses an example from Richardson (1996: p.47). We may have a "'social eating' drive" (Anderson, 2012: p.13). This arises from our drives to eat and socialise, presumably with accompanying affects, and it is a distinct drive (Anderson, 2012: p.217-223). Anderson then suggests the following.

> "There is a still looser whole into which the standing drives and affects organize themselves for the purposes of recruiting one another to secure their contents and complements. This larger, looser structure is the minimal self, a functional grouping of drives and affects that permits such mutual recruitability." (Anderson, 2012: p.226)

Anderson understands the Nietzschean self as a psychological object distinct from its constituent drives.

> "It makes sense to treat each of the things contributing to the self - i.e. each drive, affect, higher-order attitude, etc., up to and including the self as a whole - as a psychological object in its own right, even though they all stand in relations of mutual dependence. The minimal self is but one psychological structure among the others. It acquires the right to the name 'self' simply in virtue of being the emergent structure that encompasses *all* of the substructures available for recruitment by one another." (Anderson, 2012: p.226-7)

So Anderson finds his desired Nietzschean self. The self is not eliminated, everyone has a *minimal* self. The self cannot be reduced to one drive or set of drives. It is over and above the drives and affects it emerges from. Lastly, there is no transcendental or metaphysical understanding of the self. There are two points in need of clarification.

Anderson never explains what he means by "over and above". The term seems to be built into his theory in order to provide the self with certain capabilities. However, it needs to be applicable to other psychological structures. If the 'social eating drive' is not over and above its constituents then we will struggle to see how the self can be

so because the self is simply the highest structure formed by our psychological components. "Over" appears to refer to the idea that the 'social eating drive' is irreducible to the drives to eat and socialise. It is "over" these drives in that it is *distinct* from these drives. "Above" appears to capture the idea that the 'social eating drive' is more complex than its constituents. If the 'social eating drive' is distinct from and irreducible to the drives to eat and socialise then we can see how it can interact with these drives *in its own right*. The minimal self is "over and above" in just the same way. It is "over" in that it is distinct from any one of its constituents and can thereby enter into relations with its various constituents. It is "above" in that it is the most complex psychological object within an individual.

We also need a better grasp on the minimal self. Anderson claims that drives "coalesce…into…structures around particular intentions and patterns of action" (Anderson, 2012: p.226). The 'social eating drive' forms itself around the act of social eating. The highest structure that the drives organise themselves into apparently has the purpose of "mutual recruitability" (Anderson, 2012: p.226). The minimal self is a structure that forms itself around the intention and action of recruitment of *all* lower-level psychological structures. A problem that will return later is that Anderson provides two examples of complex psychological structures, the self and the 'social eating drive'. The self is *not* "fundamentally different in kind from the attitudes that compose it" (Anderson, 2012: p.225). However, the 'social eating drive' is *a drive* whereas the self is not. Much of Anderson's motivation for his account of selfhood is a resistance to understanding the self as a dominant drive (Anderson, 2012: p.214-216). The problem is not that we can make no sense of the existence of a Nietzschean psychological structure that is not a drive. Rather, drives are Nietzsche's explanatory device for thought and action. Anderson claims that the self is a distinct structure that can perform actions, primarily recruitment, but that it is not a drive. Such structures appear to be missing in Nietzsche's work. Our behaviour is explained in terms of drives. Anderson correctly notes that such explanations can be complex. A given action might be explained by the interaction between various drives and affects. We *might* be able to posit the existence of drives with ever increasing complexity. However, that something else emerges from this interplay that is not itself a drive, but plays an explanatory role in action may be a step too far without a better grasp on what this emergent structure is. Unfortunately, Anderson does not give us a clearer

idea of what he has in mind. Instead, the self is posited as a structure that just can perform certain actions.

Leaving this problem for now, we can answer questions (1) and (2) above.

1) Anderson's Self: The highest level of psychological structure that forms in order to facilitate and carry out the mutual recruitability of lower-level structures.
2) It is called the self in virtue of being the most complex psychological structure that encompasses all other structures.

Anderson's main aim with regards to Nietzsche's practical philosophy is to find a self that might self-create, self-master, and so on. Being "over and above" its constituents, Anderson suggests that the self "can suffer from a 'gap' between its own activity and that of some constituent(s)" (Anderson, 2012: p.227). Just because a certain drive can be recruited by the self, it does not follow that the self will successfully recruit it. In such a case, the self will evaluate the recalcitrant drive negatively. By understanding the self as a distinct psychological object, Anderson attributes to it "the capacity to take up attitudes…towards the world and also towards itself and its drives and affects" (Anderson, 2012: p.228). Importantly, the self is a psychological *object* that *has* this capacity.

Anderson notes that the minimal self does not fulfil Nietzsche's ideal of a self that can self-create. Just because I negatively evaluate the expression of a drive, I do not thereby alter this expression. Anderson introduces the notion of a "normative self" (Anderson, 2012: p.231). This self "is just a more unified, more harmoniously ordered, more internally disciplined and effective 'social structure'" (Anderson, 2012: p.231). A minimal self is capable of reflecting on itself. However, such reflection does not entail self-control. The normative self can control its constituents as it desires. As we will see later, Nietzsche has various criteria for being considered an ideal or free self. One must control oneself in the right way, but self-control could be the starting point of attainting freedom and becoming ideal. Anderson notes that the normative self is not a fundamentally different kind of self. It is a well ordered minimal self capable of controlling its constituents (Anderson, 2012: p.231). The structure and strength of the two selves differ, but they are comprised of the same psychological objects.

Anderson is relatively mute about how one may be capable of self-control. A necessary, but not sufficient capability is that of critical self-reflection. His idea seems to be that it depends on an individual's specific psychological structure. Some of us will have certain drives and affects from which a self capable of self-control can emerge. The issue of whether or not we are a normative self is an empirical matter (Anderson, 2012: p.231). We can know if someone is an example of a normative self by examining their life. We now have a brief answer to (3).

> 3) The possibility of self-control is the foundation of Nietzsche's practical philosophy. The normative self has the ability to self-control because it is strong enough to realise its self-evaluation in action.

5.2 Rejecting Emergence

Despite his insights, Anderson's account of the minimal self as an *emergent object* is misguided and unnecessary for explaining Nietzsche's practical philosophy.

Anderson is aware of Nietzsche's view that everything is in perpetual flux (GS: 111. TSZ: *Blissful Islands*).

> "The 'boundaries' of the minimal self are porous in principle; there is nothing to prevent my forming and acquiring new drives and affects, nor driving some of the ones I have out of existence." (Anderson, 2012: p.224)

This idea is problematic for Anderson's own theory. The self is an *emergent object* that allows for the mutual recruitability of the structures from which it has emerged. Take a self, S, that emerges from drives A, B and C. S is an object that allows for the mutual recruitability of these drives. Suppose C becomes weak through lack of gratification and that C is inimical to A's gratification. Eventually A forces C out of the psychological manifold. S is no longer an object that allows for the mutual recruitability of A, B and C because C is not there. S is an object that allows for the mutual recruitability of A and B. We need to know what happens here in terms of emergence.

The first option is that S disappears and S2 emerges from A and B. If the self emerges from lower-level structures, whenever those structures change, a new self

emerges. This might make problematic *any* notion of self-creation and the like. As soon as one self disappeared any achievements would go with it. Furthermore, I may struggle to see the point in self-creation if the self I create may disappear at some point. Secondly, Anderson would not accept such a view. "The minimal self must have its own…identity, which persists across *changes* of drives and affects" (Anderson, 2012: p.224). The question is whether Anderson can support his own suggestion.

The second option is to suggest that S persists in our individual as an object that allows for mutual recruitability, but that its possible recruits have changed. S emerged from A, B and C, but C was removed. This contradicts another of Anderson's claims. The self is a "looser whole into which the standing drives and affects organize *themselves*" (Anderson, 2012: p.226, emphasis added). This supports the above idea that with C out, A and B must re-organise themselves into a new whole. The self is not just an object that allows for recruitability. It is an object that allows recruitment of the drives from which it emerges. S's self can no longer emerge from A, B and C because C is not part of the structure.

The third option is to identify the self as the repository of standing drives. Anderson claims the self exists "as a *repository* of recruitable drives or affects" (Anderson, 2012: p.223). The self is thereby identical when or because certain drives and affects persist. Though the whole repository is in flux, there is a sense in which it is identical because of a core group of lower-level structures. Furthermore, it is identical because the self just is the repository. My self is my repository regardless of what is in that repository. This makes the notion of emergence even murkier. If my self is a repository of drives, I don't appear to be constituted by anything "over and above" those drives. Though the repository is distinct from any one of its drives, it is not distinct from the sum of those drives. There is no distinct object that emerges as anything more complex than the repository taken as a whole.

Finally, we could claim that a capacity emerges from the fluctuating lower-level structures. This might be the capacity for mutual recruitability or self-reflection. The latter is not Anderson's view. He treats the self as a psychological *object* that *has*, rather than *is*, the capacity to reflect. Despite Anderson's focus on objects rather than capacities, the former could work as a charitable reading. The self is the capacity for mutual recruitability that emerges from the repository of drives and this capacity is identical throughout change in that repository. This leads to further objections.

Anderson posits a psychologically complex self to account for Nietzsche's anti-atomism (BGE: 12). However, his emergentism faces three counts of explanatory excess. The first problem can be explained by examining lower-level structures. The 'social eating drive' emerges from some combination of the drives to eat and socialise. This new psychological structure is both *complex* and *distinct* from lower-level drives. It seems that such a structure is complex in that it subsumes the goals of lower-level drives. Whilst the social eating drive is distinct from the eating and socialising drives, it incorporates them in some specific way. Yet the eating and socialising drives still exist as distinct drives. This seems to be an excess of explanatory psychology. My desire to have a dinner party can be explained, it seems, by reference to active eating and socialising drives *momentarily* recruiting each other along with certain affects. Anderson claims that these drives have formed a new and distinct drive with a highly specific goal. This seems to be unnecessary. My objection here is not the same as that made by reductionists utilising Williams' theory (1993). That being that belief in the existence of certain psychological capabilities, such as self-reflection, can "be explained in terms of the minimal belief/desire apparatus or…[are] fabrication[s] of moral consciousness" (Anderson, 2012, p.209). My motivation to have a dinner party cannot be explained in terms of basic desires alone. Yet it can be explained by appealing to certain drives, affects and the complex relationships between them. Anderson needs to show that my desire for a dinner party can only be explained by a specific and complex 'social eating drive', but there is no obvious or independent motivation for this claim. Applying this to the self, I would argue that what the self is can be explained in terms of a complex totality of psychological structures. These structures may be relatively simple, but as an interrelated whole they make up something complex. The actions, beliefs and desires of a self cannot be explained by appealing to minimal structures alone. However, we don't need to posit the existence of some emergent object that multiplies explanatory apparatus.

The next two problems return to the earlier problem. Anderson posits the existence of a structure that seems to have the capabilities usually ascribed to drives, but is not itself a drive. Whilst this is problematic in itself, it is also unnecessary. Either the capacity for mutual recruitability or an object that allows for mutual recruitability is said to have the capacity to reflect on its constituents. Drives can evaluate each other. They seek to supress and master each other. We don't seem to need the drives to

organise themselves into a structure in order for them to evaluate each other. They just need to inhere within the same individual, no matter how disorganised and unstructured. Anderson's view is perhaps supposed to capture the idea that a self can evaluate drives in terms of the self's goals rather than the goals of individual drives. This leaves us with the question of what a self's goals are. Perhaps the goal of the self is mutual recruitability. However, the self is not a drive so we don't *need* to understand its activity as a goal or value. Furthermore, Nietzsche thinks selves can have goals and values beyond drive recruitment. These are provided by a self's active and dominating drives. I evaluate a drive as inimical to my values because it opposes the value of my dominating drive or drives. It is unclear what Anderson's account is adding here. We don't need to posit the existence of an emergent object or capacity for mutual recruitability to see how deliberation, evaluation and reflection, especially at the minimal level, are possible.

The same problem arises with the self-control of a normative self. We should understand this as the activity of dominating drives. If Anderson wants to suggest that the normative self can control its drives because the emergent object or capacity has, *in itself*, the capability to control drives then he burdens the self with an unfounded capability. He is wary of this, claiming that the normative self "is not anything fundamentally different in (psychological) kind from the minimal self…it is just a more unified…more internally disciplined and effective 'social structure'" (Anderson, 2012: p.231). So the discipline *does* come from the ways in which drives behave towards each other. A normative self controls itself because its constituent drives exist in a harmonious structure that works towards a common goal. We do not need the emergence of anything from the lower-level drives. The control is exhibited by the harmonious drives themselves.

Finally, we come to recruitability. Anderson provides arguments for and examples of the fact that drives and affects recruit each other. The upshot is that drive recruitment is essentially a psychological given for Nietzsche. It seems completely at odds with his foundations then for Anderson to claim that the self is a "whole into which the standing drives and affects organize themselves *for the purposes of* recruiting one another" (Anderson, 2012: p.226, emphasis added).

> "When drives and affects recruit one another, the resulting patterns of relations among them…emerge from the interactions of the drives and

> affects themselves; they are not relations…that would have to be established by an explicit or implicit act of 'synthesis' on the part of some unified agency separate from the drives." (Anderson, 2012: p224)

Here, drive interaction is, or at least involves, recruitment. The resulting pattern of relations that emerges out of the organisation of the self is mutual recruitability. So the view seems to be that drives recruit each other *in order* to recruit each other. This emergent 'whole' looks completely unnecessary. One could claim that organisation does not amount to recruitment. Instead, drives and affects 'combine' and 'organise' themselves into a whole and *then* they can recruit each other. However, Anderson *does* talk about combination requiring mutual recruitment and says nothing to preclude pre-self recruitment (Anderson, 2012: p.221).

We could suggest that the self exists prior to other forms of recruitment. The "interaction of drives and affects, based on mutual recruitability, is a basic and incredibly widespread feature" of Nietzsche's psychology (Anderson, 2012: p.222). Perhaps the self exists as a structure allowing for mutual recruitability and *then* drives and affects combine in various ways to generate complex lower-level structures. However, Anderson describes mutual recruitability as a "widespread feature", not the capacity or function of an emergent object. Furthermore, we will again struggle with emergence on this view. Drives and affects appear to be able to recruit each other in virtue of existing within the same individual. At least, that is all that needs to be the case. They do not need structure to recruit each other, but recruitment leads to structure.

Finally, we could focus on the idea of *mutual* recruitability. Drives and affects might already recruit each other, but the self allows for mutual, rather than tyrannical or accidental, recruitment. We might allow this to be the case in the normative self, but it is far too much for a minimal self. A minimal self's drives and affects recruit each other, but not in any kind of mutual harmony. Anderson, aware of this, states that the constituents of the minimal self "are not interrelated by their having been (actually) recruited by one another, but by their mutual availability for (possible) recruitment" (Anderson, 2012: footnote 36). We now have a minimal self that is defined simply by the availability of drives for possible recruitment. Again, all that needs to be the case for this to happen is for a drive to exist within a psychological manifold. No organised structures, emergent objects or emergent capacities are required to see how

a drive *might* get recruited by others. We have seen that there is no clear way of understanding Anderson's use of emergence that coheres with all the other areas of his thought. We have now seen that we do not need to posit the existence of emergent objects or capacities, over and above the drives, in order to account for complex behaviour, evaluative capacities or recruitment capacities. There is no need then to force a coherent understanding of emergence out of the limited discussion that Anderson provides.

The final problem is that there is no concrete textual evidence for Anderson's view. There is evidence that an ideal self can stand back from its psychological structures to reflect and act upon them. Anderson, like Gardner, supposes that a self so capable must exist as something distinct from these structures. Unlike Gardner, he finds this self without a transcendental framework. Anderson's theory does not explicitly contradict much of Nietzsche's work. However, it is not explicitly supported by any text. The only sort of emergence we find in Nietzsche's work is the emergence of ideal or free selves. This is usually mentioned in terms of historical context. At the level of individuals, Nietzsche discusses the attainment of freedom, the realisation of oneself, and so on. This could be understood as a kind of emergence. However, Anderson requires emergence at the minimal level. We will now develop a new approach to Nietzschean selfhood which has been hinted at in the objections.

5.3 Nietzsche's New Self

Our new account of Nietzschean selfhood will hold onto Anderson's beneficial insights whilst overcoming the objections to his theory.

I view the Nietzschean self as the complete structure of an individual's drives, affects and the variety of relationships between them. At a minimal level, this structure may contain many conflicting drives. At a normative level, this structure will be highly organised. However, nothing distinct emerges from this total structure. The self simply *is* the total structure. To quote Anderson:

> "The Nietzschean self is...not merely a Humean 'bundle' of intrinsically unrelated 'distinct existences'…Nietzsche's conception of the relations between drives and affects forces the posit of a thicker notion of the self, existing as a *repository* of recruitable drives or affects that are always available to complete any of its given active drives or affects." (Anderson, 2012: p.223-4)

Contrary to Anderson, I do not see this repository as emerging from, or being over and above, lower-level structures. The self is a bundle, but not "of intrinsically unrelated 'distinct existences'". This view is reductionist in some ways. The self could *in theory* be picked apart. In *HH* 106, Nietzsche uses the example of a waterfall to dismiss the notion of free will. It could be applied to the self. A waterfall appears to us as *one part* of a river, emerging from some underlying facts. In reality, it is nothing more than base materials standing in specific, determined relations to one another. It can be reduced to these facts and understood solely in terms of them. However, we cannot identify any one of these facts as *the waterfall*. That reference term is reserved for the totality. If anything emerges here, it is nothing but a name[9]. The self is not distinct from or over and above its underlying structures. The self is what we call all of these structures taken together within an individual. The self is distinct from any one of its parts, but not from the sum of its parts. Anderson uses the term "subpersonal" (2012, p.224) and Gardner the "underlying manifold" (2009: p.5) to describe certain psychological structures. I take it that these terms denote psychological structures existing beneath the level of selfhood. I propose that there are no such things as subpersonal structures within a Nietzschean self. Every part of our psychological manifold, taken together, constitutes our self. Importantly, as Anderson notes, consciousness does not limit the boundaries of the Nietzschean self (Anderson, 2012: p.224). The Nietzschean self is not comprised of a 'person' and 'subperson'. There is simply a 'subperson', but being the only structure that constitutes our being, it is promoted to 'person' or 'self'.

This account overcomes the problems with Anderson's theory. It can easily account for psychological change. If the self just *is* the totality of drives, affects and their relations **(DAR)**, when a new drive arises it simply counts as a new part of the same self. Secondly, there is no explanatory excess. We can explain an individual's behaviour by appealing to specific parts of their DAR. These specific parts may still be complex given that they involve multiple drives, affects and relations. They can still be attributed to a self as they are some part of a totality that is specific to a given individual. Thirdly, the self is not provided with any special capabilities. The capabilities that the self has are conferred by the capabilities that its constituent drives

[9] Perhaps a final alternative in understanding Anderson-Emergence. If so, let my work be read as a development of Anderson. I maintain that using the philosophically murky concept of emergence is not useful or necessary for understanding Nietzschean selfhood.

have. As we have seen many times now, there is textual evidence for conceiving of the self as nothing more than a DAR, a non-emergent "social structure of the drives and emotions" (BGE: 12).

There might be two minor worries about this self. Perhaps the self should be understood as only the portion of the DAR of which we are conscious. To begin, we are not conscious of a fixed portion of our DAR and our selves should not be understood as simply our dominant drive or drives. Secondly, what we are conscious of depends on the concepts by which we are conscious of ourselves and these may change overtime or between generations and societies. Thus, this view would face the first problem of emergence. We would constantly become different selves. Finally, Nietzsche suggests we should understand ourselves through our actions and our actions are the expression of drives which we may not always be conscious of.

Secondly, we can read Nietzsche as suggesting that there are some features of the mind other than drives that influence behaviour. Three prominent examples are the intellect (D: 109), the memory and the capacity of forgetting (GM: II-1). First, it is not established beyond interpretative doubt that these features cannot be reduced to certain kinds of drive activity. More importantly, if they cannot be so reduced, we need only view them as instrumentally influential. They might be a part of Nietzschean selfhood, but the extent to which they are important in action and thought depends on how drives use them. It would be a mistake to think that their existence would dramatically alter Nietzsche's conception of selfhood found in *BGE* 12. We must now account for the possibility of self-reflection.

5.4 Self-Reflection

In order to reflect on ourselves we must observe and know, or try to know, ourselves. For Nietzsche, all observation and knowledge is perspectival.

> "Perspectival seeing is the *only* kind of seeing there is, perspectival 'knowing' the *only* kind of 'knowing." (GM: III-12)

Perspectives come from different drives. No kind of self is capable of disinterested reflection. If an emergent self is capable of standing back to reflect on itself, it can only do this from the perspective of a given, or possibly chosen, drive. At the minimal level we do not require a self that is distinct from the psychological manifold in order

to be self-reflective. It may not be chosen, but any dominating drive can provide a perspective on the self. This seems more problematic at the normative level. Nietzsche claims that Sovereign Individuals have the "the capacity to have all the arguments for and against *at one's disposal* and to suspend or implement them at will" (GM: III-12). This seems to be a capacity for *choosing* drives to provide a perspective on the self or the world. I will later argue that Sovereign Individuals are not the ideal of Nietzschean selfhood. However, we can avoid simply discarding the possibility of controlled reflection. A normative self is constituted by an ordered DAR that works in global unity for the benefit of the whole structure, the self. Importantly, the will to power is strong and enduring in normative selves. This self is not simply the will to power, but it is largely governed it. There are many passages where Nietzsche extols the virtues of those in which the will to power dominates and vice versa.

> "I call an animal, a species, an individual depraved when it loses its instincts....I consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for *power*: where the will to power is lacking there is decline." (A: 6)

I understand the will to power as a vague drive[10]. By this I mean that it can be satisfied in many ways. In order for the will to power to maximally satisfy itself it seems fair to assume that it must utilise a wide variety of drives and affects. In the normative self, the will to power seeks to increase the power of the whole self. A condition of gaining more power in the perspectivist context is that as many perspectives on life as possible are entertained. If the will to power is functioning properly it will utilise a number of drives to achieve this. Any utilised drive will serve the will to power. The perspective of the utilised drive will be evaluated by the will to power. This does not mean the perspective will be obscured. It will simply be evaluated in terms of its

[10] The will to power is another highly debated Nietzschean concept. Some think that it is not a drive, but a kind of fundamental biological life force, present in all things (Emden, 2016). The debate is beyond the scope of this thesis and I must settle for a perhaps simplistic reading. However, even if the will to power is such a life force, biological or otherwise, we see in the quote from *The Anti-Christ* that life can lack it. Thus, the normative self is one in which the will to power is strong enough to organise the drives into a harmonious structure, thereby benefitting the power of the individual. See Clark (1990: p.227) for the will to power as a drive. See Soll (2012: p.119-121) for the will to power as a largely psychological thesis.

ability to increase the power of the individual. Secondly, the will to power is not exempt from reflection. When a drive is utilised it provides a perspective on the whole structure. Thus, a 'standing back' is possible. The normative self can reflect on itself as a whole by means of the will to power utilising different drives which provide specific perspectives on the world and the self.

With this apparatus in place, it is time to consider our second inconsistency.

> "If a person's life trajectories are determined in advance by the natural facts about himself, then how can a person really create himself?" (Leiter, 2001: p.289)

We have now fully motivated this paradox. We have seen that drives are fully responsible for who we are and how we behave. There is nothing that amounts to selfhood beyond all our "natural facts"[11] taken together and we have no capacity to alter these facts that does not amount to drive interaction. Despite this, we can overcome the paradox. We will see how by an exploration and rejection of Leiter's solution. We will then overcome Gardner's worries about valuing and subjectivity.

6 - Re-Locating the Self

6.1 The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation

Leiter claims that "there is, as it were, no 'self' in 'self-mastery'" (Leiter, 2009: p.125. 2001: p.318). He qualifies this by saying: "that is, no conscious 'self' who contributes anything to the process. 'Self-mastery' is merely an effect of the interplay of certain unconscious drives" (Leiter, 2009: p.125. 2001: p.318). This conscious self is what I identify as an X. It provides us with the capacity to suspend the influence of drives. Leiter could be claiming either that Nietzsche thought an X exists as an epiphenomenal entity or that Nietzsche rejects the existence of an X. We have seen that we should endorse the latter. We have also seen that Nietzsche still endorses the existence of a self, as a DAR, that can be conscious of drive deliberation. There are two objections to Leiter's solution to the paradox.

[11] We are remaining agnostic about just how 'natural' these facts are.

Leiter's solution is to claim that we need to understand self-creation as being devoid of any self or at least conscious self.

> "Our paradox is resolved by understanding fatalism to be the dominant theme in Nietzsche's work, while his talk of 'creating' the self is merely the employment of a familiar term in an unfamiliar sense, one that actually presupposes the truth of fatalism." (2001: p.319)

The view seems to be that when Nietzsche speaks of self-creation he is really speaking of something like creation-of-the-self. The 'self' is created by unconscious drives. For Leiter, the self plays no causal role in willing or acting (Leiter, 2009: p.125). This is not a satisfactory solution to the paradox. The paradox arises because Nietzsche eliminates certain conceptions of selfhood and endorses a drive-based fatalism. This stands in contrast with his ideal of self-creation. Leiter's solution doesn't properly tackle the language and ideas Nietzsche uses in his practical philosophy. Free individuals are not simply *created*, they *create*. My own solution is similar to Leiter's. Taking 'self-creation', I argue that Nietzsche redefines the 'self'. Leiter argues that 'self-creation' is redefined so that the 'self' doesn't actually create. Something needs to be said for my chosen redefinition.

Leiter's account of Nietzschean selfhood is focused on the theoretical work rife with eliminativism and epiphenomenalism. The deeper problem with Leiter's solution is that it misunderstands Nietzsche's practical project. This project is a radical *overcoming* of the elimination of the concepts that we hold so dear. This amounts to a re-conceiving of those very concepts. In *BGE* 12 the soul as it has traditionally been conceived is eliminated, "but the road to new forms and refinements of the soul-hypothesis stands open". In *BGE* 21, free will, as traditionally conceived, is eliminated, as well as the unfree will. The very idea of willing is not thereby eliminated. Following from this, despite Nietzsche's rejection of moral responsibility, he rebukes those that think they can shirk any kind of responsibility for themselves. We have to find Nietzsche's refinements of these concepts and how he uses them. Leiter seems overly content to stop at the eliminative stage.

Leiter presents Nietzsche in a way that allows one to overstate the similarity between Hume and the German. My account of Nietzschean selfhood is essentially a bundle theory of the self. Leiter presents a bundle theory of personhood. Though what

exactly we are a bundle *of* differs between Nietzsche and Hume[12], the key difference comes in the practical sphere.

Hume speaks of the melancholy that philosophical reasoning places him in for various reasons. However:

> "Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy…, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation…I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours of amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther." (Treatise: I-IV-VII)

Hume abandons his reflections, or is alleviated by nature, whereas Nietzsche embeds his theoretical thought within his practical philosophy so as to overcome it. He subsumes his reflection by a total reckoning with it. One cannot self-create, and see oneself as self-creating, because one forgets that the self has been eliminated in favour of a bundle of drives. One can only *see oneself as creator* when one acknowledges that this bundle of drives just is what one is.

The problem with Leiter's idea that one does not create, but is created, is that it amounts to the flight from responsibility that Nietzsche wants to avoid. It leads to the view that one is inert and must just wait to see how one turns out. There is much that is right about Leiter's analysis. In one sense, we are simply created. However, this is only the case from a perspective that holds onto the idea of some kind of agent-X, albeit a causally inert one. Leiter misses Nietzsche's final step. When or *if* one can acknowledge one's DAR as nothing less than oneself then the world of selfhood, willing and responsibility is revived. This is why it is preferable to read Nietzsche as reconceiving of the self and then fully endorsing self-creation as a creative *act of the self*. It not only enables us to make more sense of his practical language, but captures the full extent of his practical philosophy.

[12] Hume has it that we are a bundle of perceptions (Treatise: I-IV-VI).

6.2 Subjective Valuing

Gardner has the following problem with Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy applied to the practical sphere.

> "The Nietzschean subject lacks any rational warrant for regarding his valuation as anything more than the expression of a natural force; and this notion - that one could take one's values, not just when viewing oneself sideways on but also *in the very act of* legislating and endorsing them, to be nothing more than the causal effects of pre-normative psychological forces - encounters a problem of sheer inconceivability for subjects in whom the taste for justification is well established." (Gardner, 2009: p.16)

This challenges my account of the Nietzschean self, suggested to be a repository of "pre-normative psychological forces". We can overcome this challenge. First, there is no such thing as a "pre-normative" drive. Quite the opposite, drives bring with them their values and norms as the ends to which they strive. When we are in the grip of the drive to cruelty, we normatively legislate cruelty as a goal towards which we strive. Nevertheless, Gardner has two valid questions.

1) How can we justify some values over others?
2) How do we understand acts of valuing and justification in a subjective way?

There are two answers to (1). We can or should justify the values that come from *our* drives. We should reject the values that are provided by socialised herd mentality. Secondly, we can or should justify the values of drives that facilitate our power and reject those that diminish our power. Thus, we can distinguish between the values that come from our own drives. Some of these drives may be acquired overtime or become socially perverted. If they negatively influence our ability to gain power then we should reject their values or suitably redirect their expression. We might now ask why we should accept the values that increase our power. Accepting these self-serving values is the only way to escape nihilism. This will be explored later. We turn now to question (2).

The problem of self-alienation arises for Gardner if we must accept that our values come from an uncontrollable psychological structure. This removes any sense of an 'I' behind our values. The self, understood as a DAR (total structure of drives, affects and their relations), appears only as an object and cannot capture subjectivity. This misunderstands Nietzsche's radical philosophy and the idea of *achieved* selfhood or subjectivity.

Hume is happy to be removed from his theoretical reflection. Leiter fails to follow Nietzsche's practical reckoning with his theoretical work. Leiter thereby fails to capture subjectivity. Gardner cannot see how Nietzschean theory can be embedded in a practical philosophy. Hume is a manifestation of the tension that Gardner highlights. His reflection is opposed to what he needs to believe about himself in the practical sphere and he cannot overcome this. However, for Nietzsche, one *achieves* subjectivity when one accepts that one is nothing but a DAR.

Take conscious deliberation. Note that Nietzsche would say those with a taste for justification are governed by some drive to justification or knowledge. So there is a higher-level tension as one must also take the desire for justification to be the expression of a drive. Nietzsche tells us that conscious deliberation is conceptual awareness of drive interplay. Gardner is worried about the following self-conception. My conscious deliberation is just conceptual awareness of the interplay of my drives. The implications of this self-conception are, again, that we are an 'I' that *has* subpersonal drives. The further implication is that the 'I' is alienated from other parts of the person because it has no power over them. Nietzsche rejects this distinction. The 'I' just is those drives, whether they are conscious or not. If one comes to perceive oneself as nothing more than a DAR then a change occurs. One takes *oneself* to be deliberating simply because *one is deliberating.* That is, one's conscious deliberation, consciousness of deliberation, is seen as an *expression of oneself*. Gardner falsely characterises the problem by claiming that when justifying values one must take one's values as "nothing more" than the expression of drives. When we achieve the correct self-conception our values are an expression of *ourselves* and this is precisely what justifies those values. When one gains a Nietzschean self-conception one takes oneself to be the thing that values, deliberates and acts.

Secondly, the self is distinct from any one part of the DAR, but not from the sum of those parts. When a potential value is provided by a specific drive it is evaluated in terms of its utility for increasing the power of the individual as a whole. The

statement, ‘I value P’, can be picked apart as follows. P is valued by drive Z. I am a DAR. DAR is inclined by Z to value P. P is valuable to my DAR. Therefore, I value P. P is subjectively accepted or chosen as a value. There is an ‘I’ utilising a drive and choosing a value, but this ‘I’ is a DAR.

Finally, we can examine our self-referential language. Alienation is a problem when we think: ‘*My* values are provided by *my* DAR’. This statement assumes that the DAR is owned by some ‘I’. Nietzsche makes the DAR the referent of this ‘I’. We can restate the above as: ‘DAR’s values are provided by DAR’s DAR’. Once the DAR is accepted as the self we can go further: ‘*My* values are provided by *my-self*’. This may just be a trick of language. However, Nietzsche views the traditional conception of selfhood as just such a trick (BGE: 16). That trick created the illusion of some distinct self, over and above the body (drives). Nietzsche’s trick strongly affirms that the self is no more than the body. “The enlightened man says: I am body entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body” (TSZ: *Despisers of the Body*).

6.3 The Paradox Properly Resolved

Fatalism holds that our life trajectory is ‘fixed’ by the drives that constitute our self. There is scope here. One with a strong drive to truth may become a priest, scientist, philosopher, and so on. It will depend on social and historical context as to how these drives express themselves. Self-creation is possible when the values that we follow come from the free expression of our drives. We will elucidate this idea in the next section. Leiter’s paradox is resolved in two ways. Firstly, it *can be* one*self*, as opposed to society, that creates one’s values. Secondly, we can *take ourselves* to be the creative force behind our lives when we achieve Nietzschean subjectivity. Of course, it is down to the drives as to whether or not Nietzsche’s concept of a self is internalised.

Our penultimate task is to see how Nietzsche develops his own compatibilism. We will see that self-creation amounts to a kind of freedom and that there is still a higher form of freedom available.

7 - Nietzsche's Free Self

7.1 The Sovereign Individual

In *GM* II-2, Nietzsche introduces the Sovereign Individual **(SI)**. The SI is purported to have free will. As such, it is common for scholars to take the SI as representative of Nietzschean freedom. We will see that this is a mistake and then develop the correct understanding of Nietzschean freedom.

> "The *sovereign individual*…the man with his own independent, enduring will, the man who is *entitled to make promises*. And in him we find a proud consciousness…of *what* has finally been achieved here, of what has become incarnate in him - a special consciousness of power and freedom, a feeling of the ultimate completion of man. This liberated man, who is really *entitled* to make promises, this master of *free* will." (GM: II-2).

The key characteristic of the SI is their entitlement to make promises. They are so entitled because they are free to determine their own action. Only an SI is strong and free enough to resist internal and external obstacles to fulfil a promise. The idea then is that Nietzsche views traditional free will as illusory only because we don't all have it. When we achieve it, we become an SI. Acampora (2004) and Loeb (2005) have convincingly suggested that the SI is not representative of Nietzschean freedom.

Starting with the simplest of Acampora's arguments, SIs are mentioned almost solely in *GM* (Acampora, 2004: p.152-3). If Nietzsche considered the attainment of free will such that one can make promises as his greatest ideal, he would appear to have paid little attention to it.

Secondly, Acampora notes Nietzsche's preoccupation with *becoming*. Who we are is not fixed. This does not contradict fatalism. The idea is that, within certain parameters, we are constantly changing. Different drives wax and wane, we re-create ourselves in different ways, and so on. The desire to be a fixed subject, to be able to stand security for some future action, would appear to contradict this. Furthermore, the possibility of being able to ensure a future action seems to be questioned by Nietzsche. Whether it is from self-creation or not, we are in a state of constant flux with drives continually growing and fading (Acampora, 2004: p.153).

These objections open the possibility of further inconsistency. However, close attention to the SI blocks this thought. The SI is the result of an "enormous process" that aims to make humans responsible for their actions (GM: II-2). In order to do this, humanity undertakes "the task of breeding an animal which is entitled to make promises" (GM: II-2). This task "presupposes as its condition a more immediate task, that of first *making* man…necessary, uniform…regular and consequently calculable" and "it was by the means of the morality of custom and the social straight-jacket that man was really *made* calculable" (GM: II-2). The SI is the end product of the morality of custom and social constraint. Nietzsche does not think highly of this morality of custom. Its goal is to make humans autonomous *to the extent* that they can be held morally responsible for their actions and accordingly rewarded or punished. "Modern conceptions of the individual as autonomous have been crafted in order to press them into the service of moral accountability and retribution" (Acampora, 2004: p.151). This conception of autonomy originates in the slave morality that inverts master morality. The "downtrodden" achieve the heights of this inversion by asserting that "*the strong may freely choose* to be weak, and the bird of prey to be lamb - so they win the right to blame the bird of prey for simply being a bird of prey" (GM: I-13). The purpose of the morality of custom is to assert that one, *disconnected from one's actual nature*, can choose who to be and what to do. The success of this process and its products, such as the SI, is not an ideal state of affairs for Nietzsche.

Next, Nietzsche never claims that the SI *has* free will. What we find is a *consciousness* or feeling of free will. As consciousness is simply conceptual awareness, this amounts to an *interpretation* of certain psychological facts. The above analysis highlights that this interpretation has social origins. The SI 'knows' that it has free will because a social concept is used to fix a feeling arising from underlying facts. However, the SI has "broken away from the morality of custom", they are a "supra-moral individual". The SI no longer needs the guidance of social custom to act morally. This is the height of Kantian moral autonomy, the idea that the moral law comes from within. One can deduce the moral law "from the universal concept of a rational being as such" (G: 4-412). What the SI forgets is that these laws are simply the laws of society. Society forces the animal to see itself as a rational being and that there are certain laws that bind such beings. SIs really believe this. They assume responsibility for their moral actions, but the actions they consider moral are those that society has decided are moral. Finally, the SI is an *achieved* product. It is a

contemporary phenomenon that stands at the end of a long history. Nietzsche's project is an overcoming of our contemporary situation (Acampora, 2004: p.156-7).

Nietzsche posits a future beyond the SI. Through a careful support of the scholarly rewards we gain by giving *Thus Spoke Zarathustra (TSZ)* its proper place in Nietzsche's philosophy, Loeb draws our attention to Nietzsche's philosophy of the future (Loeb, 2005: p.71-74). *TSZ*'s key concept is "the *idea of eternal recurrence*" which Nietzsche claims to be "the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be obtained" (EH: *Books*-TSZ-1). Second, "the concept 'superman' [in *TSZ*] becomes the greatest reality - all that has hitherto been called great in man lies at an infinite distance *beneath* it" (EH: *Books*-TSZ-6). Next, after *TSZ,* "the affirmative part of [Nietzsche's] task was done", from then on all his "writings are fish-hooks" for *TSZ* (EH: *Books*-BGE-1). *BGE* and *GM* are destructive books aimed at negatively revaluating old ideals (EH: *Books*-BGE-1). "What was lacking above all was a *counter-ideal - until the advent of Zarathustra*" (EH: *Books*-GM). Finally, at the end of *GM* II, Nietzsche points to the "man of the future, who will redeem us as much from the previous ideal as from *what was bound to grow out of it*, from the great disgust, from the will to nothingness, from nihilism" (GM: II-24). The presentation of this future is "something which only *Zarathustra* is at liberty to do" (GM: II-25). 'Zarathustran Freedom' is meant to overcome 'Sovereign Freedom' as a real form of freedom. Zarathustran Freedom will be explored shortly, but it should be understood as a freedom from nihilism.

There are signs of Nietzschean freedom in works other than *TSZ.* The SI is not such an example. However, we have seen that Nietzsche valorises self-creation, and rejects both the free and *unfree* will.

7.2 Autonomy

May (2009) argues that Nietzsche's ideal freedom is Zarathustran Freedom. However, for a self to become free it must meet four conditions: "(a) a maximum number of drives, (b) each of them of maximal power, is (c) organized into an evolving hierarchy in which (d) one can take satisfaction" (May, 2009: p.90).

(a) Drives provide valuations and perspectives of the world. More drives entails more potential perspectives and values. Thus, "one can see and create" in more ways (May, 2009: p.93-4).

(b) The more power one's drives have the more potential power one has over oneself and the world. However, these drives must work together, not against each other (May, 2009: p.93).

(c) A "hierarchy is a matter of commanding and obeying - of one's drives becoming organised in such a way that one is able to commit oneself to projects that matter to one" (May, 2009: p.90). This hints at May's inclusion of promising in Nietzschean freedom, to be examined later. May does not conceive of the process of organisation, or self-creation, as being guided by any "metaphysical 'doer' standing behind its 'deed'" (May, 2009: p.92). "Successful hierarchy is…not the result of something…called 'free will'; it is free will" (May, 2009: p.91).

(d) Self-satisfaction comes through experiencing oneself as free. Experiencing oneself as free is constituted by: i) delighting "in seeing oneself as a commander", ii) delighting "in seeing one's command as effective" and iii) not seeking "faith in a dogma that is given or collective" (May, 2009: p.91-2). (ii) is explained as delighting in "seeing one's 'protracted and unbreakable'[13] will in action, a delight that seems to involve intense awareness of one's…capacity to commit oneself to action" (May, 2009: p.91).

There are a number of problems with these conditions. Firstly, they need some initial amendments. Secondly, I will reposition these conditions in Nietzsche's philosophy of freedom. Thirdly, this repositioning will lead to further amendments.

It is difficult to understand the notion of having a maximum number of drives. There is no drive checklist. Throughout our lives drives might come and go. Drives may also come and go throughout human history. Without an exhaustive list, we could suggest a number to designate a maximum. This would be arbitrary and lacking in textual support. A more plausible condition would be that May's self must continually incorporate new drives and their perspectives. Rather than a stable maximum we have an ongoing activity that seeks a perhaps unattainable maximum.

Next, we need to finesse the ideas of drives acting with maximum power and hierarchical organisation. Consider the guilty Christian. They have a drive to cruelty

[13] *GM* II-2: "The free man [(SI)] - the owner of an enduring, indestructible will".

that expresses itself inwardly. The more powerful this expression, the guiltier the Christian feels. This leads to more self-punishment and self-denial. May is aware that drive interplay can lead to inner turmoil. The more drives we incorporate and the more powerful they are, the more unstable we become (May, 2009: p.94). This is why we require hierarchical organisation. However, drives may be hierarchically organised such that the drive to cruelty is allowed to vent inwardly and used to supress other drives. This might be why May includes the condition of self-satisfaction. The Christian is not fully self-satisfied because he is ashamed of his natural instincts. However, hierarchical organisation does not necessarily lead to satisfaction. We could appeal to the shunning of external dogmas, but not adhering to given dogmas does not lead necessarily to a hierarchy that does not deny life or supress drives to some extent. May suggests that powerful drives must work harmoniously together. This would seem to solve the problem, but it needs clarification. We require a hierarchy that serves the power of the individual as a whole[14]. The evolvablity of this hierarchy is key. The power and direction of drive expression must be carefully managed to suit different situations. In social situations, my drive to cruelty must be managed so that I don't obviously express it on others. This may mean *temporarily* supressing or redirecting it. When fighting, I must allow this drive its most powerful outward expression. I thereby come to gain power over different aspects of the world in different ways.

This is consistent with the idea that Nietzsche urges his readers to: "Become what you are!" (TSZ: *Honey Offering*). May characterises this in terms of finding our own purpose in life. Becoming who we are amounts to a discovery of "the organising 'idea'" that will govern our lives (EH: *Clever*-9). So the point here is not that we do or should seek total world domination, but that we must find who we are and then we can organise ourselves around this idea. It is dangerous to impatiently seek the idea too soon. Also of value is exploring multiple avenues. Furthermore, if we are too eager to find the idea we risk falsely conceiving of ourselves (May, 2009: p.92). This is because such an idea is already growing within us, preparing us in ways unknown (EH: *Clever*-9). This fits with the above in two ways. Firstly, the gaining of power in different situations is key for finessing "*individual* qualities and abilities" (EH: *Clever*-9). By mastering different situations one learns how best to organise oneself

[14] Hinted at by May (2009: footnote 16).

and prepares one's drives for the greater task yet to emerge. Secondly, in urging us to become who we are, Nietzsche wants us to become those "who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, [and] create themselves" (GS: 353). We will soon see that such self-creation amounts to the expression and acquisition of one's own power. We will also see that the heights of power, power over time, are achieved when one affirms life. One does not need to dominate everything, but must learn to find what truly satisfies oneself. This might mean slowly becoming focused on one goal. Finally, our organising idea may change, different things may bring us satisfaction throughout our lives. We must be careful not to consider ourselves too fixed. We can continually become who we are. Nietzsche himself one day became a professor, another a philologist (EH: *Clever*-9).

This leads to our repositioning of May's conditions in Nietzsche's philosophy of freedom. May posits these conditions as necessary for achieving Zarathustran Freedom and I agree. Zarathustran Freedom involves the ultimate liberation of the will. However, I believe there is a lower-level freedom, *Nietzschean autonomy*, which is achieved by May's initial conditions. May ambiguously refers to autonomy in two places (May, 2009: p.90, p.94). He suggests that his conditions define "the maximally free, autonomous self" (May, 2009: p.94). However, May holds that the constitution of self characterised by (a) - (d) is "the first condition…for freedom" and not enough to be maximally free (May, 2009: p.90). Secondly, May does not *appear* to want to establish a lower-level freedom. If he does, then let the following be further support and finessing of his view. Nietzschean autonomy is characterised by the ability to live by one's own values.

> "One can dispose of one's drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis…All this we are at liberty to do: but how many know we are at liberty to do it? Do the majority not *believe* in *themselves* as in complete *fully-developed facts*?" (D: 560)

> "Do you call yourself free? I want to hear your ruling idea, and not that you have escaped from a yoke.
> …
> Free from what?...Your eye should clearly tell me: free *for* what?

> Can you furnish yourself with your own good and evil and hang up your own will above yourself?" (TSZ: *Way of the Creator*)

Freedom here is not Zarathustran Freedom, notwithstanding one quote from *TSZ*. It is a freedom that is characterised by one's ability to self-create. We have seen that such self-creation is compatible with fatalism. One self-creates when one's values and changing trajectory are an expression of one's own drives. We will now develop this notion.

Nietzsche equates morality with tradition and suggests that "the free human being is immoral because in all things he is *determined* to depend upon himself and not upon tradition" (D: 9). Freedom from the yoke of tradition is important, but Nietzsche has a nuanced take on what this amounts to. Remembering the link between freedom and immorality, Nietzsche notes that "if an action is performed *not* because tradition commands it but for other motives (because of its usefulness to the individual, for example),…it is called immoral" (D: 9). Tradition is "a higher authority which one obeys, not because it commands what is *useful* to us, but because it *commands*" (D: 9). This presents the first element of Nietzschean autonomy. Autonomy is living by values that one chooses oneself because of their "usefulness" to oneself. Those that *create* new values exercise Nietzschean autonomy. However, *D* 9 shows that autonomy does not *necessarily* require the creation of new values, but the following of values that are useful to oneself. This might mean following existing values. Our next task is to understand what Nietzsche means by "usefulness".

It is instructive to begin by looking at what is useful for a society. We will soon see that the means by which a society creates and evaluates values is the same means by which the individual does so. Additionally, we have seen that an individual is a social structure of drives. Values useful to a society are those that facilitate its thriving. Every society has different requirements. "If [a society] wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates. Much that seemed good to one people seemed shame and disgrace to another" (TSZ: *Thousand and One Goals*). Next we learn that "whatever causes [a society] to rule and conquer and glitter, to the dread and envy of its neighbour, that it accounts…the evaluation and the meaning of all things" (TSZ: *Goals*). This leads us to the means by which a society legislates "useful" values.

> "A table of values hangs over every people. Behold, it is a table of its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power." (TSZ: *Goals*)

Above we saw that free individuals hang their own will above themselves. We should now see that this means such individuals create and evaluate according to their own will to power. By expressing one's own will to power one follows values that are useful to one's thriving. As with neighbouring societies, such expression will lead to differing values between different individuals. We cannot say which values are going to be useful for each of us. However, in order to live by values which are useful to ourselves, the creation and evaluation of values must be governed by our own will to power. We thereby create ourselves and our own trajectories. The will to power is a will to mastery.

> "Where I found a living creature, there I found will to power; and even in the will of the servant I found the will to be master.
>
> The will of the weaker persuades it to serve the stronger; its will wants to be master over those weaker still…
>
> And where sacrifice and service and loving glances are, there too is will to be master." (TSZ: *Self-Overcoming*)

This will is incredibly broad in scope. "It will want to grow, expand, draw to itself, [and] gain ascendancy" (BGE: 259). We will see later that this broadness means that Nietzschean autonomy is necessary, but not sufficient for Zarathustran Freedom. For now, we have arrived at our understanding of Nietzschean autonomy. One is autonomous to the extent that one's values are an expression of one's own drives governed by one's will to power.

This leads to further amendments to May's conditions, now understood as an achievement of autonomy. Firstly, the idea of having or trying to attain a maximum number of drives seems redundant. One can be autonomous regardless of one's drive tally. All that is required is that drive expression serves one's will to power. Hierarchical organisation must be retained. Only in an evolving hierarchy can drives effectively serve the power of the individual. Condition (a) is slightly misplaced. Nietzsche speaks of philosophers being able "to see the greatness of man, the concept 'greatness'…in his wholeness in diversity: [the philosopher] would even determine

value and rank according to how much and how many things one could endure and take upon oneself" (BGE: 212). *Greatness* is determined by how many drives "one can see and create" with (May, 2009: p.94). Whilst greatness may require freedom, freedom does not require greatness. An individual constituted by the drive to cruelty alone may be free, but not great because they can only take one perspective on the world.

Finally, self-satisfaction is not needed to be considered autonomous. One does not even need to know that one is autonomous to be autonomous. There is no textual evidence that would contradict this idea and no independent reasons for why this could not be the case. One is autonomous to the extent that one's values serve one's power. As this amounts to the expression of drives, one may be doing this without knowing it. We will see that self-satisfaction is key for Zarathustran Freedom, but it need not enter the picture at this stage.

We can now restate May's conditions as those that constitute Nietzschean autonomy. A self must be comprised of (a2) drives of maximum power, (b2) organised into an evolving hierarchy, (c2) that serve the power of the individual. The two dropped conditions, (a) and (d), are still important. However, (a) is a condition of greatness rather than freedom and (d) will return with Zarathustran Freedom.

The above attributes to Nietzsche a subversive, revisionary account of freedom as autonomy. Nietzschean autonomy amounts to the expression and acquisition of power, by and through the drives. As the Nietzschean self is nothing more or less than the totality of one's drives, we can see that this expression is a kind of self-governance. However, on various interpretations of the term, this kind of self-governance is not sufficient for exhibiting autonomy. Nietzsche denies the existence of an agent, distinct from the drives, that might cause, influence, authorise or condone behaviour. We need to ask how and why Nietzsche can revise our concept of freedom to such an unrecognisable degree.

Here it will be useful to briefly note Richardson's account of Nietzschean freedom. Richardson suggests that Nietzsche understands freedom as "an evolving ability with an idea of itself" (Richardson, 2009: p.131). This capacity evolves with a mutable idea of itself, "an idea of what is being done, of what this freedom is it's achieving" (Richardson, 2009: p.130). Nietzsche's negative treatment of freedom is aimed at its present manifestation. His positive project is to "redesign" freedom into something

"appropriate for us today" (Richardson, 2009: p.131). Richardson presents three key stages in freedom's history.

The first stage is drive-freedom. This is constituted by a stable unification of the drives such that they effectively express themselves under the rule of a dominating drive or drive cluster (Richardson, 2009: p.134-136). Next comes agency-freedom. For Richardson, agency is a capacity to restrain our drives developed in us by society in order to make us subservient (Richardson, 2009: p.136-141). However, agency is also a "kind of drive itself" (Richardson, 2009: p.137). Currently, agency makes us the puppets of society, but Nietzsche aims at a synthesis of agency-freedom and drive-freedom. In this third stage, a Nietzschean "redesign" adapts our agency to "serve [a] new end - which [Nietzsche] thinks is life's old end - of power" (Richardson, 2009: p.131).

My notion of Nietzschean autonomy is similar to Richardson's notion of drive-freedom combined with the positive notion that the free individual aims at their own power. Stability and unification should not be taken to describe a self that is a finished product with a fixed set of goals. The self is a fluctuating hierarchy of drives and this fluctuation is desirable. An autonomous Nietzschean self is stable and unified in the sense that drive fluctuation is regulated and evaluated in terms of the power of the individual. However, this may involve differing degrees of lower-level disunity and instability over time.

Agency-freedom is supposed to account for the existence and role of consciousness. Socially generated concepts have an impact on our lives. Additionally, we appear to consciously choose, deliberate and so on (Richardson, 2009: p.136-137). I have argued that we can account for these phenomena without positing the existence of effective capacities distinct from the drives. Furthermore, Richardson's understanding of agency is confused. It is both a drive and opposed to the drives. If it is a drive then agency-freedom is no different to drive-freedom. The evolution story crumbles. Freedom is simply drive-freedom, but over time different drives govern the self. Nietzsche's 'synthesis' is simply the toppling of agency-rule. However, this is not what Richardson sees Nietzsche as trying to do. It is suggested that the agency-drive could be used in a positive way that serves the individual. There is further confusion here. It is suggested that "agency will still constrain drives, but now in their own interest: its [role is] to discipline them, and to foster the emergence of a unifying passion" (Richardson, 2009: p.148). Drives seek to continually express themselves

so constraint is inimical to their interests. It might be within the interests of a group of drives, a self, to be suitably constrained at certain times. However, this kind of constraint is achieved in drive-freedom and agency is unnecessary. Secondly, we saw with May that consciously seeking one's governing idea is a foolish undertaking that risks missing it entirely, yet this is exactly what Richardson seems to claim agency should be used for. For these reasons, I do not follow Richardson in the introduction or positive application of agency-freedom. Agency as a distinct capacity, unique drive or otherwise, is nothing but an erroneous self-conception. This brings us to what is useful in Richardson's account.

We begin with the mutability of concepts. Whilst I disagree that freedom is an evolving *capacity,* I agree that we have an evolving *conception* of freedom. Nietzsche's complex genealogies demonstrate that he views concepts as human playthings. The idea that 'autonomy' or 'freedom' *must* capture certain ideas is nonsense to Nietzsche. There is no essence to the concept 'freedom'. It has a long history that we should not consider complete or necessarily reality-tracking. It is a concept that has been used to generate certain moral self-conceptions and commitments. These self-conceptions are erroneous and the commitments inimical to our thriving. Most importantly, the idea that 'freedom' must capture, for example, drive-distinct agency, is morally loaded. The only reason that 'freedom' should capture such agency is so that it can support our moralised notions of responsibility. As Nietzsche wants to reject these notions, he need not capture what is currently implanted into our concept of freedom. We might accept the above, but we should then ask why Nietzsche *wants* to retain the concept of freedom at all. It seems as though it would be preferable to abolish it in favour of a philosophy of power.

Richardson notes an important fact about freedom. We value it to a high degree (Richardson, 2009: p.128). We want to view ourselves as free and exercise our freedom. Power, on the other hand, is morally dubious. Nietzsche rejects our understanding of freedom. Yet this cannot reduce the value that we place on being free. In order to engage his reader in his project, Nietzsche offers a new kind of freedom. This guards against the incredulous rejection of his work and prevents casting his readers into despair at their impotence or joy at their lack of responsibility. By revising our understanding of freedom, Nietzsche appeals to our values whilst radically subverting them.

Additionally, Nietzsche advocates a revaluation of power. The ascetic ideal has hypocritically perverted our assessment of power expression such that it is counted as evil. For Nietzsche, power expression is the essence of all life. To affirm life we must affirm such expression. Nietzsche encourages the reverence of one's own power by suggesting that expressing and seeking power is constitutive of our beloved freedom.

We should now see why Nietzsche retains the concept of freedom as autonomous self-governance whilst radically revising it. He demonstrates the mutability of concepts and the validity of creatively revising them. Furthermore, he uses the concept of freedom to engage his reader whilst initiating a revaluation of freedom and power. We now go on to explore Nietzsche's ideal freedom.

7.3 Zarathustran Freedom

Zarathustran Freedom is a freedom from nihilism. Nietzschean nihilism is a "will to nothingness". This is a will that affirms that which is beyond our own world and *all* of its aspects (GM: III-28). May highlights three stages of nihilism.

First, "the will to nothingness affirms the unconditioned - be it called the 'God' of monotheism, the 'forms' of Plato, unconditionally valuable values…or other such metaphysical categories" (May, 2009: p.101). The idea is the affirmation of *absolute* truths and values. No such things exist for Nietzsche so to will and affirm them is to will what is not there, will nothing (May, 2009: p.101). The second stage is that faith in truth begins to undermine our belief in metaphysical absolutes. However, we do not thereby shake the ideas that these absolutes introduced into the world. Our morals remain unchanged. We still see ourselves as having free will and so on. Most importantly, the unconditional value of truth is still maintained (May, 2009: p.101-2). Finally, our unrelenting faith in truth undermines all of our values including itself. This is a more traditional understanding of nihilism. It is the idea that the world is without value or meaning (May, 2009: p.102). Nihilism here still affirms that which is not reality. It affirms that the world is valueless and meaningless because there are no absolute values or meanings.

There are many ways in which we need to overcome nihilism, but two are specifically related to my analysis of selfhood and self-creation. Firstly, one must accept that one's self is nothing more than a DAR. Other conceptions of selfhood affirm that which is not there. They both come from and entail other manifestations

of nihilism. Secondly, the notion that the world is valueless is an absurdity for Nietzsche. As long as we have drives, we have values. Our mistake has been to take some values as absolute. When one sees oneself as a DAR, one realises that one can create one's own values to infuse meaning back into existence.

We now come to the complete freedom from nihilism whereby it gains the name Zarathustran Freedom. Ultimate freedom from nihilism is both *manifest in* and *attained by* joyful affirmation of the doctrine of eternal recurrence **(ER)**. Though *TSZ* is a full exploration of this idea, it first appears in *GS*. Nietzsche asks us how we would feel if a demon told us the following.

> "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence - even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!" (GS: 341)

Nietzsche asks whether such a thought would throw us into despair or fill us with immense joy. He then asks: "How well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to crave nothing more fervently* than this ultimate confirmation and seal?" (GS: 341). To see the power of this thought experiment we must take a step back. In *TSZ*'s *Of Redemption* we learn that:

> "Will - that is what the liberator and bringer of joy is called…now learn this as well: The will itself is still a prisoner.
>
> Willing liberates: but what is it that fastens and fetters even the liberator?
>
> 'It was': that is what the will's teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past.
>
> The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction."

Zarathustra here refers to the will to power. We see the idea that we can self-create by exercising our Nietzschean autonomy. Yet our will is still chained by time, it is not truly free. In order to be free, the will must not somehow manage to change the past. What still binds the will is nihilism. It wills nothingness because it wishes it could change the past, change aspects of reality. May characterises time as the last object of *ressentiment* (May, 2009: p.96-7). Unable to change time, "the will…becomes malefactor: and upon all that can suffer it takes revenge for its inability to go backwards" (TSZ: *Redemption*). As the will cannot take revenge on time itself, it seeks to vent its *ressentiment* on other objects. Zarathustra goes so far as to claim that "this alone is *revenge* itself: the will's antipathy towards time" (TSZ: *Redemption*). This final manifestation of nihilism must be overcome. ER gives us the tools to achieve this.

> "To redeem the past and to transform every 'It was' into an 'I wanted it thus!' - that alone do I call redemption!
>
> …
>
> All 'It was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance - until the creative will says to it: 'But I willed it thus!'
>
> Until the creative will says to it: 'But I will it thus! *Thus shall I will it!*" (TSZ: *Redemption*, emphasis added)

Zarathustra comes to apprehend the truth of Nietzsche's demonic statement. Alluding to *GS*, Zarathustra says even "this slow spider that creeps along in the moonlight" will return (TSZ: *Vision and Riddle*). Zarathustra walks with a dwarf, "the Spirit of Gravity", who represents those that call "earth and life heavy" (TSZ: *Vision and Riddle, Spirit of Gravity*). This spirit perhaps represents ourselves and Zarathustra the demon itself. For the rest of *TSZ* III, Zarathustra wrestles with ER until finally coming to "lust for eternity…The Ring of Recurrence!" (TSZ: *Seven Seals*). We should now see that affirmation of ER amounts to willing ER. One wills every 'it was' not just backwards, but forwards. If the willing just went backwards then it would amount to acceptance of the past. However, by willing ER one wills a certain future. This future is exactly the same as the past so one comes to *will the past.* This has three consequences.

Firstly, affirmation of ER amounts to a *manifestation* of one's freedom from nihilism. We can re-introduce May's condition (d) here. As I will soon argue, we must drop the SI-style language. All we need is a 'simpler' self-satisfaction with who one is, although one can still delight in seeing oneself as a creator. Free individuals create their own values and themselves. However, in order to affirm ER, one must lack any form of self-contempt or contempt for life. One does not wish for anything past or present to be different so one no longer wills nothingness. Nietzsche asks how well disposed to oneself and life you would have to be to affirm ER. The answer is clearly: very well disposed. Another of Stern's epistemological worries is that those who posit a particular kind of drive organisation as being Nietzsche's ideal or concept of freedom face the problem of never being able to know when such organisation is achieved (Stern, 2015: p.129). ER overcomes this problem. It is only when one's drives are properly organised that one is capable of taking complete satisfaction in oneself and in life. To see whether or not anyone is so organised, we ask how they feel about ER. A joyful craving of ER *demonstrates* that they are so organised as to be considered ultimately free. Furthermore, such freedom necessarily involves Nietzschean autonomy. ER is a test of one's freedom.

Affirming ER also attains the affirmer ultimate freedom as it liberates the will from the prison of time. One affirms oneself as "a piece of fate" (TI: *Errors*-8). This means affirming one's place in history, one's time-boundedness (May, 2009: p.97-8). By willing time, and everything in it, to eternally recur, one is no longer "an angry spectator of all things past" (TSZ: *Redemption*). One craves just these things and is liberated from their unalterable nature. This leads to the final consequence. Affirming ER does not just liberate the will from time, it gains the will power over time. Time becomes willed by oneself and is thereby bought under one's control, if only by a certain way of *perceiving* it. Because one wills the eternal return, it is perceived as issuing from oneself.

This draws out a tension between Nietzschean autonomy and Zarathustran Freedom. Zarathustran Freedom amounts to a freedom from nihilism, but also gains us mastery over time. In order to master time, one needs to affirm every aspect of life. However, we seem to be able to express our will to power in life denying ways. Ascetic priests, for example, express their will to power in the creation of nihilistic value systems. If the will to power wants mastery over time and if this requires life

affirmation, it seems as though the will to power could not express itself through life denying values. To the contrary, Nietzsche sees this as a sickness inflicting humanity.

Feeling imprisoned by time, the will to power "releases itself in a foolish way" (TSZ: *Redemption*). Here we connect with the ideas above. "A great foolishness dwells in our will; and that this foolishness acquired spirit has become a curse to all human kind. *The spirit of revenge*:…that, up to now, has been mankind's chief concern" (TSZ: *Redemption*). The will to power desires power over time, but finds no way of gaining it. So instead it expresses itself by seeking mastery over other aspects of the world. This amounts to autonomy, but it is not sufficient for Zarathustran Freedom. Nietzsche's examination of Saint Paul demonstrates this. All too briefly, Nietzsche sees Paul as inventing Christianity in order to liberate himself from the Jewish laws that he knew he could not fulfil. "With the idea of becoming one with Christ all shame, all subordination, all bounds are taken from [Paul's soul], and the intractable lust for power reveals itself as an anticipatory revelling in *divine* glories" (D: 68). Paul creates new values and ideals to satisfy his will to power. As such, he exhibits Nietzschean autonomy. However, his new ideal is extremely life denying. Paul does not wish to live his earthly life eternally, but waits to join Christ in heaven. Nietzsche is hyperbolic in his description of Paul's self-salvation. Paul remains bound by nihilism. He cannot affirm the eternal return of the same and as such his will to power remains vengeful towards time.

Gaining mastery over time does not mean subverting or negating it. One gains mastery over time by affirming it. One affirms time when one wills ER. In order to will ER, one must lack any self-contempt or contempt for life *as it is*. So in order to gain mastery over time, one must live according to values that will facilitate life affirmation. Zarathustra attempts to release the will to power from its vengeful foolishness. It is not that we should not attempt to change or subvert anything, such as existing value systems, but that we should do so in a life affirming manner. However, such life affirmation is not a necessary feature of autonomy.

We now come to the problem of whether or not Nietzsche thought ER was a cosmological truth. Loeb thinks he does (2005: p.84), May does not touch on the issue. I suggest that, on Nietzsche's own terms, the cosmological reality of ER is of no importance. Firstly, the role ER plays for Nietzsche is indifferent to its truth. Affirmation of ER is a manifestation of one's freedom and gains the will power over time. However, these are matters of perception. It is a manifestation of freedom

because it demonstrates how well disposed to oneself and to life one is. It gains power over time by perceiving time as willed by oneself. Affirming ER does not provide one with new abilities, one cannot change time and that is the point. What is important for Nietzsche is not the truth of ER, but for the individual to *crave it*. Secondly, affirmation of ER cannot be contingent on its truth. If one need only affirm ER *if* it is true then freedom becomes contingent on the affirmation of a truth and truth retains its *unconditional* value. This leads to a potential problem. If one craves ER and ER is *not* true then it might be another manifestation of nihilism. However, the trick of ER is that it affirms everything that has been. It does not affirm that which might be, it is a craving for the same to recur eternally. One wills to repeat life exactly as it is. It is thereby a manifestation and attainment of freedom whether or not life will actually recur. This analysis does not call into question the previous ideas of accepting oneself as a DAR and seeing oneself as a value creator. Everything, including truth, has *conditional* value for Nietzsche (Gemes, 2006: p.197). Accepting the reality of drive-based selfhood has conditional value as it puts one on the path to Zarathustran Freedom. Accepting other accounts of selfhood pushes us deeper into nihilism. However, Zarathustran Freedom does not rely on the truth or falsity of ER. Even if Nietzsche did believe that ER was a cosmological truth, it would not alter the role it plays in his philosophy.

We must now understand what affirmation or willing of ER really amounts to. The question Nietzsche wants an answer to in *GS* is much more serious than anything such as: 'Do you have any regrets?', 'Would you change anything?', or even 'Would you like to live once or twice again?' The question is: 'How does the thought of ER make you *feel*?' It is therefore not enough to simply claim that one wills time or joyfully accepts ER. It is also not enough to accept or resign oneself to the truth of ER. May notes that we might accept ER by means of some welfare calculus (May, 2009: p.103). This too fails to affirm ER. As has been alluded to, affirming ER amounts to a *joyful craving* for ER, regardless of its truth. Furthermore, this must be continual. One cannot crave ER just when one has good experiences, one must crave it even when one suffers. This is how we come to will ER. We don't claim "Thus I will it" because we *should*. We master time because the prospect of ER fills us with great joy and we then come to will it.

This brings us to a familiar problem. To become free we need to will the return of some terrible events, not just in our lives, but in the lives of all those before us.

Affirming ER might be a psychopathically selfish method for achieving freedom (Clark, 1990: p.279). Firstly, the affirmation of ER is not something that we *should* do to achieve freedom. It is something that certain individuals might *be able* to do. If we cannot will past terrible events then, unfortunately, we are not free from nihilism. Secondly, affirming ER is *difficult*. It is difficult precisely because most of us cannot bring ourselves to will the recurrence of terrible events. To look for an easier way of affirming ER, one that sidesteps personal suffering and humanity's cruel history, completely misses Nietzsche's notion that such affirmation is incredibly hard-won, and is just a further manifestation of nihilism. Finally, if Nietzsche's practical philosophy offends our moral sensibilities then we may have grounds for rejecting it, but such offence is no reason to discard an interpretation of that philosophy.

Moving on, May suggests that affirming ER is not simply "an affective-cognitive state" such as a joyful craving, but that "it demands more action" (May, 2009: p.104). This action is a kind of promising and takes its lead from the SI passage examined earlier. May claims that "the capacity to promise oneself in the fullest sense - in other words in respect of one's own sovereignly legislated values, those values that our fatedness has…built into us and whose necessity we will - is the mark of the truly free and sovereign individual (GM II 2)" (May, 2009: p.104). This is an admirable attempt to combine Sovereign Freedom with Zarathustran Freedom. Unfortunately, it is internally incoherent and misguided.

May claims that "to be able to promise, to be responsible, *is* to live fully in time, to *be* one's future" (May, 2009: p.104). Affirming ER amounts to promising oneself for the future. The idea seems to be that one promises to oneself to follow the values that one legislates oneself and to accept or desire that these values are provided by fate itself. However, we need to unpack the quote above where four things are equated. First, May takes the idea of promising from *GM* II-2. Here Nietzsche understands promising as the ability to stand security for some future action. The SI can master nature and can "uphold himself…even 'against fate'" (GM: II-2). Responsibility in *GM* amounts to moral accountability. In order to breed an animal that can make promises, first those animals must consider themselves responsible for their actions, as doers behind deeds. 'Living fully in time' is rather unclear. However, after May's analysis of the time-boundedness of individuals it seems to amount to affirming one's existence as a product of history and fate. Furthermore, it is to accept the transience and flux of all things (May, 2009: p.97). 'Being one's future' is also

unclear, but it seems to be the ability to carve one's own life according to one's own values. These four things cannot be equated. First, to be able to promise is not *to be* responsible. Rather, promising requires one to conceive of oneself as responsible. Responsibility is a condition for promising, not promising itself. Next, living in time and being one's future, whilst not contradictory, are not the same thing. To be one's future is to carve one's own life, but to live fully in time is to accept fate and flux. To live fully in time one must accept that who one is might change. Whilst one can promise to follow one's own values, one must accept that one's values may change. This is the key problem. The ability to promise, for Nietzsche, comes from perceiving oneself as calculable. To promise, one's values tomorrow must cohere with one's values today. This *denies* transience, becoming and satisfaction with an *evolving* hierarchy. Similarly, to promise, to "uphold [oneself]…'against fate'" is in complete opposition to living fully in time, which is to accept and will fate not to see oneself as *against* it. Finally, Nietzschean responsibility is decidedly not concerned with the moral accountability of a doer that is tied to promising in *GM* where May takes the concept from. Given this confusion, May's introduction of promising into Zarathustran Freedom does little to elucidate our understanding of affirming ER. We can capture the full extent of the power that affirming ER has by understanding such affirmation as a joyful craving for ER, an affective-cognitive state. It demonstrates the ideal organisation of our hierarchy and gains us power over time.

May's use of promising here is misguided for two reasons. First, Nietzsche makes no mention of promising in relation to ER affirmation. He mentions the ability to will ER and affective states of fervent joy. We will ER only when it fills us with this kind of joy. May is surely aware of this in that he takes the notion of promising from *GM* II-2. Secondly, we have explored a number of reasons for rejecting this passage as representative of Nietzschean freedom, let alone ultimate freedom. The SI is a nihilistic ideal that must be overcome by Zarathustran Freedom.

We have now seen how and why a Nietzschean self can be considered free. Such selves can be seen as autonomous and view themselves as autonomous. There is also the hope of Zarathustran Freedom. We have seen that Nietzschean autonomy and Zarathustran Freedom are entirely compatible with fatalism. One is autonomous when one's values are an expression of one's drives governed by one's will to power. One attains Zarathustran Freedom when one affirms ER. We cannot simply choose

to do this, but if our DAR is ideally constituted then we can and will affirm ER. There is one last inconsistency to overcome.

7.4 Nietzsche the Preacher

I have argued that Nietzsche radically reconceives the concepts of selfhood, subjectivity, valuing and freedom within a fatalistic, drive-based framework. I have not argued that we should accept Nietzsche's philosophy. One may disagree that his understanding of selfhood, for example, can capture subjectivity. For Nietzsche, this is not just philosophical disagreement, but another manifestation of a nihilistic conceptual system. Of course, one can philosophically reject Nietzsche's claims. However, his criticisms of philosophers go deeper than philosophical debate.

> "The greater part of conscious thinking must still be counted among the instinctive activities, and this is so even in the case of philosophical thinking…Behind all logic too and its apparent autonomy there stand evaluations, in plainer terms physiological demands for the preservation of a certain species of life." (BGE: 3)

> "I…do not believe a 'drive to knowledge' to be the father of philosophy, but that another drive has, here as elsewhere, only employed knowledge (and false knowledge!) as a tool. But anyone who looks at the basic drives of mankind to see to what extent they may in precisely this connection have come into play as *inspirational* spirits…will discover that they have all at some time or other practised philosophy - and that each one of them would only be too glad to present *itself* as the ultimate goal of existence." (BGE: 6)

> "These hard, severe, abstemious, heroic spirits, who constitute the pride of our age, all these pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists, nihilists, these spiritual sceptics, ephectics, *hectic* ones…; these last idealists of knowledge, these men in whom the intellectual conscience is alone embodied and dwells today - they believe themselves to be as free as possible from the ascetic ideal, these 'free, *very* free spirits': and yet, if I may reveal to them what they themselves cannot see - for they are too

> close to themselves - : this self-same ideal is *their* ideal too, they themselves are perhaps its sole representatives today." (GM: III-24)

Philosophical deliberation is no less a manifestation of one's personal constitution than any other kind of deliberation and it is, for the most part, no freer from the deeply embedded, problematic concepts and assumptions that have their genesis in the ascetic ideal. It is not that we are all too stupid to 'get Nietzsche', it is that we are almost terminally unable to endorse or internalise his philosophy because of the conceptual system we are habituated to. This inability manifests itself in philosophical disagreement. From our perspective, Nietzsche's philosophy may seem difficult to endorse, but Nietzsche's point is that 'our perspective' is both misguided *and* extremely difficult to relinquish.

The problem then is that reading Nietzsche's philosophy is not necessarily going to bring about change. The drive to truth in philosophers, plump on metaphysics, will not simply abdicate. The drives to cruelty and sociality will not retire and release the herd member from self-punishment. These drives will make us evaluate Nietzsche negatively. Nietzsche is aware of this.

> "My time has not yet come, some are born posthumously. - One day or other institutions will be needed in which people live and teach as I understand living and teaching: perhaps even chairs for the interpretation of Zarathustra will be established. But it would be a complete contradiction of myself if I expected ears *and hands* for *my* truths already today: that I am not heard, that no one today knows how to take from me, is not only comprehensible; it even seems to me right.
>
> …
>
> Ultimately, no one can extract from things, books included, more than he already knows." (EH: *Books*-1)

> "It will be some time before my writings are 'readable' - it is something for which one must be practically bovine and certainly *not* a 'modern man'." (GM: *Preface*-8)

There are two questions here. If no one has the ability to learn more than they already know or to 'logically' accept Nietzsche's philosophy, what is the point in that philosophy? Secondly, what is the point in an account of freedom that, even if accepted, we are not free to pursue or achieve?

In answer to the second, we can read Nietzsche as explaining the conditions and possibility of freedom in a fatalistic framework. He presents the only kind of freedom available to us on his worldview. However, he does not suggest that this freedom can be attained by everyone, or even anyone. Nietzsche hopes that some individuals will be able to realise his freedom and, ultimately, does not think this hope is completely misguided. However, he thinks it will take generations before Zarathustran Freedom is realised. This leads to the general answer to these questions.

Concepts effect our lives because our drives use them to express themselves in different ways. Nietzsche should be understood as introducing new concepts and redefining old concepts in order to provide the preliminary tools for reaching a new understanding of ourselves and the world. He is aware that these tools will not be accepted immediately and that, even if accepted on some level, it will take time for them to take hold (Gemes, 2006: p.192). Consider the concept of an 'I' that stands behind thought and action. Its history is long, rich and varied. Yet amongst all the disagreement over and evolutions of the concept, it has persisted. It is not just Nietzsche that attempts to abolish it, but it has a stranglehold over our self-conception. Nietzsche's thinking is new and therefore extremely unlikely to become embedded in our lives immediately. Again, he is aware of this.

> "He who writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read, he wants to be learned by heart." (TSZ: *Reading and Writing*)

Until Zarathustra, the ascetic ideal has been the only available meaning for humanity (GM: III-28). Our need for meaning forces us to accept ascetic concepts. Nietzsche offers us an alternative, generated by new concepts. However, though this carrot now dangles in front of us, it will take more to accept its reality and still more to strain towards it. Even those that can hear Nietzsche do not by that ability become free.

> "Man is a rope, fastened between animal and Superman - a rope over an abyss.
>
> A dangerous going-across, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and staying-still." (TSZ: *Prologue*-4)

Those that understand and accept Nietzsche are preparatory. They move humanity closer to superhumanity, but do not necessarily achieve superhumanity. Nietzsche himself is waiting for "someone 'more pregnant with the future', someone stronger than" he is to take the reins of humanity (GM: II-25). The acceptance of Nietzsche's philosophy is the first step on a long journey.

8 - Conclusion

Nietzsche's theoretical and practical philosophy regarding selfhood and freedom is entirely consistent. Nietzsche rejects our traditional understandings of selfhood before reintroducing the self into his practical philosophy on his own terms. His notion of selfhood makes no appeal to, and does not require, the concepts that he theoretically rejects. We can capture subjectivity as a first-person stance that is achieved when one views oneself as no more than a "social structure of the drives and emotions" (BGE: 12). This new self exists in a fatalistic world. We are shaped entirely by our drives and our social and historical context. Nevertheless, Nietzsche offers us freedom within this world. When our selves are organised in the correct manner, we can consider ourselves autonomous and may achieve freedom from nihilism. We are free from nihilism when we joyfully crave eternal recurrence. Whilst this notion of freedom is unprecedented, it is the only one available to us. For Nietzsche, this is no conciliation prize. Nietzschean freedom is real and of significant magnitude. The meaning of life is down to us and the way we perceive life can gain us power over time itself. Rather than a contradiction, Nietzsche's practical work is a full reckoning with his theoretical reflection. Overcoming potential despair, the result is a radically subversive philosophy. Soares asks: "Where can one think of fleeing, if the cell is everything?" Nietzsche replies: "Nowhere, but *everything* is not a cell."

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Where German is used, I am referring to the eKGWB *Published Works* section that corresponds to the referenced translation.

The only reference to this source that does not refer to Nietzsche's published work occurs on p.27. The reference can be found in *Posthumous Fragments*. NF 1885, Gruppe 1[58] is referenced as (NF-1885: 1-58). NF 1886, Gruppe 7[60] as (NF-1886: 7-60).

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